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Malawi’s Maize Marketing System 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
National food security in Malawi depends on improving the performance of maize markets.  
Ensuring that grain is consistently available at tolerable prices is crucial for consumers’ food 
security.  At the same time, surplus producing farmers need to receive farm-gate prices 
consistently above production costs to intensify the use of fertilizer and other productivity-
enhancing technologies in a sustainable manner. These concerns give rise to the classic food 
price dilemma for policy makers in Malawi:  how to keep prices low enough to ensure low-
income consumers’ access to food while keeping prices high enough to promote farm 
production incentives.  These tensions cannot be avoided but they can be relieved through 
reducing food marketing margins, which shrink the wedge between producer and consumer 
prices.  Moreover, Malawi faces major political and economic problems associated with food 
price instability especially given its dependence on rainfed agriculture in a region prone to 
drought.  These issues show that improving the performance of maize markets is at the core 
of achieving sustainable food security and poverty reduction in Malawi.  
 
Agreeing upon clearly defined roles for the public and private sectors will be crucial for 
achieving reasonable stability and predictability in these essential markets.  Discussions early 
in the grain market reform process in Malawi sought to define a space for the development of 
private sector marketing.  Much of the recent discussion has concentrated on clarifying the 
role of the parastatal Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) as 
private sector participation has expanded.  However, nagging questions have marked the 
post-reform period, especially during tight food market conditions, leading to continued 
interventions by government to stabilize maize prices.  The most serious questions about 
leaving this strategic staple food market to the private sector revolve around:  (1) the capacity 
of the private sector to store grain throughout the season at reasonable margins; (2) the 
willingness of traders to buy maize from smallholders in remote rural areas and deliver it to 
deficit areas at margins in line with marketing costs; and (3) the ability to import sufficient 
maize during national production shortfalls to maintain prices at tolerable levels.  
Surrounding all of these concerns is the common perception that Malawian maize markets do 
not behave competitively, hence the need for direct state intervention. These concerns 
culminated in August 2008 with the return to mandating that all private trade take place 
within prices fixed between 45 and 52 kwacha per kilogram.  This fixed price band has 
remained in effect until today.  
 
Malawian maize markets have been subject to serious price volatility – more so than all other 
countries in southern Africa for which price data is available (Table 1).  The coefficient of 
variation (standard deviation / mean price over period) of maize prices in Malawian markets 
are all above 45% compared to ranges of 20% to 35% for most other markets in the region.  
The seasonal pattern of maize prices is also very unpredictable, with the low-price and high-
price months and the extent of seasonal price rises varying greatly across years.  It is widely 
viewed in Malawi and the southern Africa region in general that government is responsible 
for ensuring people’s access to food (Bratton and Mattes, 2003).  Food prices and availability 
are highly politicized issues in the region.  The transition to multi-party electoral processes 
over the past decade has, in some cases, intensified the politicized nature of food prices as 
political parties compete to show how they will deliver benefits to the public in times of need.  
This kind of political economy creates major challenges for the private sector to develop in a 
way that might enable it to effectively serve the needs of the millions of small-scale farmers  
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and consumers in the region.  These issues remain at the heart of continuing policy 
discussions in Malawi.   
 
This debate continues on the basis of remarkably little information about the impact of the 
liberalization on trade activity. There are no records available summarizing the level and 
directionality of major maize flows between producers, stockholders, processors and 
consumers. While farm-gate and retail price data are collected, the reporting of these data to 
key stakeholders is delayed. There has been little attempt to analyze recent price trends.  
 
 
Table 1.  Unconditional and Unconditional Coefficient of Variation by Country and 
Market, 1994-2008 
Mean Price Nominal 
US$ per Mt 
Mean Real  Price 
(Local currency  






(C/B*100)  Country Market 
(A) (B)  (C)  (D) 
Lilongwe 167  22,676  11,455 50.5 
Blantyre 201  27,285  12,544  46.0  Malawi 
Karonga 167  22,807  11,324  49.6 
Maputo 239  7,457  1,804  24.2 
Nampula 171  5,305  2,147 40.5  Mozambique 
Beira 168  5,171  2,024  39.1 
Kampala 180  346,886  105,914  30.5 
Uganda* 
Mbale 165  316,563  105,429  33.3 
South Africa  Randfontein 156  1,307  376  28.8 
Nairobi  210  23,370  6,374  27.3 
Nakuru  212  15,364  2,363  15.4  Kenya  
Mombasa  241  17,603  3,461  19.7 
Addis Ababa  169  1,868  489  26.2 
Shashemane  156  1,727  491  28.5 
Nemkept  148  1,610  574  35.6 
Ethiopia 
Jimma  151  1,646  569  34.6 
Lusaka  151  1,119,863  411,454  36.7 
Choma  128  951,930  430,758  45.3  Zambia* 
Ndola  148  1,091,992  394,348  36.1 
Dar es 
salaam  192  247,801  68,888  27.8 
Mbeya  134  173,711  54,483  31.4  Tanzania* 
Arusha  163  211,182  64,786  30.7 
Notes:  *Available price data reported by the national price monitoring systems are at retail level for all 
countries except Tanzania, South Africa, Uganda, and Zambia, which are wholesale. ** Since the introduction 
of the EAC in January 2005, Kenya has adopted a stable trade policy regime harmonizing its import tariff rates 
with neighboring east African countries (from as high as 50% down to 2.75%). So in addition to the full sample 
results, results from the two periods are included, 1994-2004 and 2005-2008. 
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This study provides evidence to guide future discussions about options for improving maize 
market performance in Malawi, and to obtain greater clarity about farmers’ and traders’ 
perceptions about maize markets and their strengths and weaknesses. The study builds on a 
2008 World Bank report (Jayne et al., 2008).  The specific objectives of this study are:  
 
i)  to understand major maize trade flows, toward the development of a market channel/flow 
diagram that estimates trade volumes and the degree of competitiveness in each channel;  
 
ii)  to understand ADMARC’s operations and how their operations influence the behavior of 
others in the value chain; 
 
iii) to estimate the margins between farm-gate prices and retail prices in nearby markets and 
to understand whether and how price changes in retail markets are transmitted back to 
farm-gate prices;  
 
v)  to estimate, to the extent possible, farmers’ and traders’ maize storage losses;  
 
vi) to use data on prices, trade flows, and household survey data to examine the degree to 
which they can corroborate official government maize production estimates; and  
 
vii) to provide a better understanding of maize markets and the perceptions and concerns of 
various key stakeholders (e.g., large traders, small traders in rural markets, smaller traders 
at large business centers, farmers and government actors) about how these markets work 






2.  DATA AND METHODS 
 
Four kinds of data were analyzed:  (1) focus group discussions of farmers and interviews with 
traders (including relatively large traders, small traders in rural areas, small traders operating 
in large business centers), government actors, and others in the maize value chain; (2) 
monthly maize prices from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation; (3) information on 
formal sector maize trade and informal cross-border trade; and (4) household survey data.  
These data are discussed in more detail below.  
 
2.1  Focus group discussions and key informant interviews: 
 
The field work took place in October 2008 and in July 2009.  The October 2008 field work 
was carried out under a World Bank study covering the districts of Blantyre, Mulanje, 
Lilongwe, Dowa and Mchinji.  In Blantyre the team visited Chilipa Extension Planning Area 
(EPA), Chanika, Lunzu, Kunthembwe and Kanjedza trading centers.  In Mulanje, emphasis 
was placed on Makokola EPA, Mulanje Boma, Chitakale Trading Center, and Chisinkha 
EPA.  In Lilongwe, the team visited Nathenje/Kamphata, Kawale, Chinsapo, Area 49, and 
Chigwirizano markets.  In Dowa District, visits were made to Madisi and Bowe EPAs.  In 
Mchinji, the team visited Chiwosya EPA and Mchinji Boma.  This makes a total of 18 
different areas in the 5 districts.  In addition, interviews were conducted with private traders 
and processors in Lilongwe and Blantyre cities.  
 
The July 2009 field work covered the southern districts of Blanytre and Mulanje and the 
northern districts of of Mzimba and Rumphi. The selection of Mzimba and Rumphi districts 
was carried out in consultation with the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security (Mzuzu 
Agricultural Development Division). Mzimba is the largest district in Malawi and a major 
maize growing district.  Rumphi is relatively more remote than Mzimba.  
 
For each district surveyed, 6 EPAs believed to reflect the diversity of the district with respect 
to degree of remoteness/accessibility were selected. Three EPAs were considered to be 
remote (relatively poor access to markets) and 3 EPAs relatively good access to markets. This 
resulted in three villages with relatively good access to markets and three with relatively poor 
access to markets per district. Access to markets was defined with reference to proximity to 
an ADMARC market.  In Mzimba, the accessible EPAs were Zombwe; Eswazini; and 
Mbawa and the remote EPAs were Emsizini; Manyamula and Luwerezi; from Mzimba north, 
Mzimba central and Southern Mzimba, respectively. In Rumphi accessible EPAs were 
Katowo; Nchenachena and Bolero with Mhuju; Mphompha and Chiweta taken to represent 
remote areas. 
 
Thus, a total of 694 farmers in 42 villages in 7 districts were interviewed through focus group 
discussions.  Of these 42 villages, 21 were considered remote, greater than 15 kilometres 
from a market town and considered as having poor infrastructural links to that market town, 
while 21 were considered relatively accessible, being less than 15 km from a market town.  
On the mornings of each day of field work, two focus group discussions of maize selling 
households were assembled. As the households arrived a one-page survey questionnaire was 
administered to the individual households on their maize sales transactions during that 
season. Information included the week and month of sale, the type of buyer, the reasons for 
choosing that buyer, the distance from the farm to point of sale, quantity sold, and price 
received.  The focus group discussions also solicited farmers’ perceptions about the pros and 
cons of selling to ADMARC vs. private traders, the number of traders coming into the village 
to buy maize in the 2008 and 2009 seasons, particular marketing problems plaguing farmers, 
and whether markets are performing better or worse over time.  
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In the afternoons of each of the first three days, approximately 4 village assemblers/small 
traders per village area were interviewed. Most of these were follow-up names obtained from 
the farmer focus group discussions. Over the three-day period in each district, this resulted in 
approximately 12 assemblers per district over the three afternoons. Information collected 
focused on trading activities, transport costs, storage cost and losses and problems that pose 
risk to the enterprise. 
 
Interviews were conducted with available large millers/processors and wholesalers, including 
ADMARC depot managers using structured interview questions. In addition, local district 
authorities and Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security officials were interviewed for their 
impressions as well. This took 2-3 days in each of the seven districts covered in the field 
work.  
 
2.2  Price data 
 
Monthly maize retail prices were obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation.  
The data were used to compute measures of price seasonality and instability, and trends in 
price levels over time.  We also compare retail prices in town centers with farm-gate prices 
obtained by farmers participating in the focus group discussions to compute spatial 
differences between farm-gate prices and retail prices in urban markets.  
 
2.3  Trade flow data 
 
Informal trade data was obtained from the regional Famine and Early Warning Unit 
(FEWSNET), which monitors monthly maize trade flows between Malawi and its neighbors 
since July 2004.  Information is collected on both exports and imports.  The government 
exported maize in 2007 to Zimbabwe and the study uses figures provided by the Malawi 
government.  Finally, the South Africa Revenue System records monthly export data to 
countries in the region, which allowed us to compute maize imported to Malawi from South 
Africa during the 2006-2009 period.  
 
2.4  Household survey analysis 
 
This study draws from 3 linked surveys of 1,210 smallholder households covering the 
2002/03, 2003/04, 2006/07, and 2008/09 crop seasons.  Nationally representative household 
survey data is provided by the National Statistics Office (NSO), which implemented the 2004 
Integrated Household Survey-2 (IHS-2) and the 2007 Agricultural Inputs Support Survey 
(AISS).  The IHS-2 survey covers the 2002/03 crop season for about half of the sample, and 
the 2003/04 crop growing season for the other half.  These two crop seasons correspond to 
the 2003/04 and 2004/05 marketing years.  Over 10,000 smallholder households were 
included in this IHS-2 survey.  A sub-set of 2,591 households were re-interviewed in the 
AISS survey, which was conducted in June 2007.  In February and July 2009, these 
households were surveyed again, covering the 2008/09 crop season.  Across all three surveys, 
data is consistently available on roughly 1,210 households.  Therefore, the household survey 
data reported in this study covers a balanced panel of 1,210 households surveyed in 2004, 
2007, and 2009.  Further analysis on the characteristics of household remaining in the sample 
and those dropping out will be forthcoming to assess potential attrition bias and means to 
correct for it.   
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3.  ESTIMATION OF THE QUANTITY OF MAIZE MARKETED THROUGH VARIOUS 
CHANNELS 
 
3.1 Farm sector 
 
Malawi’s maize market is characterized by a high degree of differentiation at the level of the 
producer.  Smallholder farmers account for over 90% of the maize production, while the 
estate sector accounts for less than 10%.  Smallholder farmers who produce marketed maize 
vary dramatically in productive capacity.  Within the smallholder sector, according to both 
the IHS-2 and AISS surveys, farm households fall into one of the following four categories 
with respect to grain markets, as shown in Table 2: 
 
i.  sellers of staple grains:   Roughly 10 to 15 percent of the smallholder farms sell grain in a 
given year.  The proportion of households selling maize was 14.3% in the 2008/09 
marketing year, 10.2% in 2007/08, 18.5% in 2004/05 and 18.3% in 2003/04. According 
to Chirwa (2006), only 10% of smallholder households sold maize in 1997/98.  Of course 
this figure will rise in good harvest years and fall in a drought year.  
 
There are two sub-groups within this category of maize selling households:  (i) a very 
small group of relatively commercialized smallholder farmers with 4 to 10 hectares of 
land, and (ii) a much larger group of smallholder farms (20 to 30 percent of the total rural 
farm population) selling much smaller quantities of grain, between 50 and 200 kgs per 
farm. The farmers prefer to sell at least part of their maize immediately after harvest 
(around April/May) because they wait for the whole year to receive their “paycheck” 
which is used to cover debts incurred over the farming season, pay school fees, etc.   
Better-off farmers with bigger surpluses to sell often reserve part of their sales for the 
October-November period to take advantage of seasonal price rises and to pay for the 
costs of fertilizer, land preparation, and other planting expenses which come at this time 
of year.  Depending on location, the maize is sold to food insecure farmers, small-scale 
traders, medium-scale traders, large traders, processors and ADMARC. These 
households, especially the largest farmers, clearly benefit from higher grain prices.  
 
ii.  buyers of staple maize:   these rural households made up roughly 56% of the rural 
population in 2007, which was considered a very good harvest year.  Chirwa (2006) The 
proportion of households that purchase maize is therefore typically higher in most years. 
As shown in Table 2, maize-buying households are generally the poorest and have 
relatively small farm sizes and asset holdings.  They are directly hurt by higher mean 
grain prices.  
 
iii.  households buying and selling grain within the same year:  Roughly 7% to 10% of 
households both buy and sell maize. They comprise both relatively large farms that sell 
grain and buy back small quantities of processed meal, but are mostly relatively poor 
households that make distress sales of grain after harvest only to buy back larger later in 
the season.  These farmers often sell their maize to meet immediate cash needs such as 
house construction, fertilizer, school fees, clothing, etc. but are forced to buy back later in 
the season when prices are generally higher.  
 
iv.  households neither buying nor selling maize:  these households made up 29% of the 
smallholder population in the 2007/08 marketing season.    
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Table 2.  Farm maize market position and wealth characteristics,  
2007/08 marketing season vs 2008/09 marketing season. 





% of total households in sample  
(n=2591 in 2007/08) 
(n=1,210 in 2008/09) 
2006/07 7.9% 
2007/08 7.1%  Sold maize/did not buy 
2008/09 10.5% 
2006/07  53.9% 
2007/08  56.4%  Bought maize and/or maize 
meal/did not sell 
2008/09  55.4% 
2006/07  4.0% 
2007/08  3.1%  Bought and sold – net seller 
2008/09  3.8% 
2006/07  4.2% 
2007/08  4.1%  Bought and sold – net buyer 
2008/09  5.8% 
2006/07  0.5% 
2007/08  0.3%  Bought and sold – net zero 
2008/09  0.8% 
2006/07  29.5% 
2007/08  29.0% 
Neither bought nor sold – 
autarkic 
2008/09  23.6% 
    Percentages sum to 100% in each year 
            Source:  AISS household survey, 2007, 2009. Full marketing year maize sales and purchases for the  
            2006/07 marketing year (in AISS I) and the 2008/09 marketing year (in AISS II).   
 
 
Maize sales tend to be highly concentrated among a relatively small number of farmers in the 
smallholder sector.  Table 3 disaggregates smallholder households included in the IHS-2 and 
AISS surveys into three groups: 1) the largest smallholder sellers of maize who accounted for 
50% of the marketed maize output; 2) the remaining households that sold maize during the 
year who accounted for the other 50 percent of the marketed output, and 3) those households 
that sold no maize during the 12-month marketing season.  
 
As shown in Table 3, one or two percent of the farms account for 50% of the overall 
marketed maize surplus from the smallholder sector. These farm households possess 
substantially higher levels of productive assets, crop income, and non-farm income, than the 
rest of the rural population.  These relatively “commercialized” smallholder farmers had 1.5 
to 2 times as much land and twice as much assets than the non-maize selling households, who 
constituted roughly 80% of the smallholder households in the sample.  Land and asset 
constraints impede most smallholder households from producing a maize surplus to sell.  
 
One noteworthy trend shown in the last column of Table 3 is that the inflation-adjusted value 
of household assets appears to have increased in the years since the AISP has been 
implemented. Twelve durable assets plus livestock assets were valued in constant 2009 
kwacha and compared across the years in Table 3.  The mean value of household assets rose 
from 8,100 and 9,600 kwacha in 2002/03 and 2003/04 to 11,700 and 10,800 kwacha in 
2006/07 and 2008/09, respectively.  However, the mean quantity of maize sold by households 
in the sample shows no clear trend, moving from 65kg per household in the 2003/04 




Table 3.  Concentration of Maize Sales within the Smallholder Farm Sector 
 
   Category of farm household    









for other 50% 







2003/04 (IHS – first year)             
   Percentage of total households in sample (%)  2.00  15.63  82.23  100 
   Value of assets (‘000 kw per hh)  23.0  10.0  8.8  9.2 
   Landholding size (hectares)  2.38  1.43  1.43  1.45 
   Kgs maize sold (kgs per hh)  1,551  202  0  65 
  
2004/05 (IHS – second year)             
   Percentage of total households in sample (%)  2.54  13.25  84.21  100 
   Value of assets (‘000 kw per hh)  16.4  10.1  7.5  8.1 
   Landholding size (hectares)  1.69  1.52  1.06  1.15 
   Kgs maize sold (kgs per hh)  987  151  0  45 
 
2006/07 (AISS I)             
   Percentage of total households in sample (%)  1.34  15.31  83.35  100 
   Value of assets (‘000 kw per hh)  23.5  11.5  11.5  11.7 
   Landholding size (hectares)  2.06  1.48  1.14  1.2 
   Kgs maize sold (kgs per hh)  2,203  189  0  58 
  
2008/09 (AISS II)             
   Percentage of total households in sample (%)  1.92  18.91  79.16  100 
   Value of assets (‘000 kw per hh)  22.6  13.7  9.9  10.8 
   Landholding size (hectares)  1.94  1.41  1.19  1.25 
   Kgs maize sold (kgs per hh)  1,494  160  0  59 
Source:  IHS-2 survey conducted by NSO in 2004/05; AISS1 survey conducted by NSO in 2007; AISS2 
survey conducted by NSO in 2009.  Assets are the value of 12 durable assets plus livestock assets 




We now estimate the amount of maize being sold by smallholder farmers in Malawi.  
Government of Malawi estimates of total smallholder maize production in the two years 
covered by the IHS-2 survey (2002/03 and 2003/04) and the two AISS surveys (2007/08 and 
2009/10) are presented in Table 4, column (a).   The proportion of total maize production that 
is sold is presented in column (b), based on the national household surveys.  By multiplying 
the figures in columns (a) and (b), we derived the estimated quantity of maize sold by farmers 
in the smallholder sector for these four harvest years.  Note that each of these years was 
considered a fairly good crop production season with favorable rainfall.  The estimated 
quantity of maize sold by smallholder farmers – including sales to traders, other households, 
and ADMARC – is in the range of 160,000 to 480,000 tons.   
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Regarding maize sales from the estate sector, very few reliable estimates are available.  
However, a recent report estimated that estate sector maize sales are in the range of 150,000 
tons.   
 
 












harvest sold by 
farmers (%)  
Quantity of marketed 
maize based on 
official production 
estimates (tons) 
Average quantity of 
maize produced per 
household according to 
the HH surveys (in kg)
2 
   (a)  (b)  (c=a*b)  (d) 
2003  2003/04  1,758,688  12.3  216,319  530 kg (n=511) 
2004  2004/05  1,733,125  9.6  166,380  472 kg (n=551) 
2007 2007/08  3,444,456  13.0  447,779  463  kg  (n=1,126) 
2008 2008/09  2,777,438  na    Na  na 
2009 2009/10  3,777,316  12.9  487,274  423  kg  (n=1,186) 
Sources:  Ministry of Agriculture (column a). Column b and d derived from Integrated Household Survey-2 and 
Agricultural Inputs Support Surveys, 2007, 2009.  Column c derived as a*b.  Note:  If post-2007 official maize 
production estimates are overestimated as is often suspected (see for example Lea and Hanmer, 2009, p.9), then 
marketed quantities in column c should be revised downward for 2007/08 and 2009/10.  Among the analysts 
involved in the Agricultural Inputs Support Programme evaluation, there are concerns that survey figures in 
column (d) underestimate maize production per household.  
 
 
Based on the above information, we can now construct some basic estimates of national 
maize supplies circulating in Malawian markets.  From Table 4, the quantity of maize 
marketed from domestic production in recent years has been in the range of 400,000 to 
450,000 tons from the smallholder sector, and perhaps 150,000 to 200,000 tons from the 
estate sector, depending on the quality of the weather and the amount of fertilizer used.  Note 
that all of the years from which estimates are available in Table 4 were relatively good 
production years.  After adding supplies from marketed domestic production, we estimate 
that the quantity of maize supplied in an average harvest year is roughly 500,000 to 580,000 
tons after accounting for storage losses assumed at 12%
1 of total as shown in Table 5.  This 
estimate of marketed maize from domestic production includes household-to-household sales 
in the villages which never come onto markets as such.  
 
Table 5.  Estimated marketed maize supply from smallholder and estate sector 
production. 






 ------------------  metric  tons  -------------------- 
Supplies from smallholder production  200,000  400,000  450,000 
Supplies from estate production    70,000  150,000  200,000 
Total maize supply  
(before storage losses)  270,000 550,000  650,000 
Total maize supply (after assumed 12% 
storage loss on marketed supplies)  241,000  491,000  580,000 
 
                                                 
1 See section 3.7 on storage losses.  
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Based on the interviews of grain traders and farmer focus group discussions, we computed 
the share of smallholders’ maize sales according to the type of buyer, as reported in Table 6. 
These figures are unweighted averages of the responses obtained for the 2008/09 season 
(between April and October when the 2008 field work was carried out).  The aggregate 
picture of the maize purchases through October 2008 shows that on average only 7.99% of 
the maize sold by farmers has been purchased by ADMARC.  The bulk of it (about 92%) has 
been bought by private traders.   ADMARC anticipated buying more early in the season but 
the rise in maize prices in 2008 led to temporary working capital shortages. ADMARC’s 
biggest presence was in the Lilongwe and Blantyre areas, where it purchased roughly 17% 
and 14%, respectively, of the grain sold by farmers.  ADMARC purchased very little in the 
other areas surveyed (Dowa, Mulanje, and Mchinji).  It is estimated that 16.5% of the maize 
sold by farmers was direct farmer-to-consumer exchanges, typically within the same village.  
Small/medium traders purchased 29.1% of farmers’ maize, while 45.2% was purchased by 
large traders directly from farmers.  Large traders buy from farmers and small/medium-scale 
traders.   
 
Table 6.  Estimated proportion of maize sold by farmers to different categories of 
traders 












      
Blantyre  14.38 84.62  38.08  46.54  0.00 
          
Mulanje  0.00 100.00  19.90  34.70  45.39 
          
Lilongwe  16.56 83.44  16.69  41.72  25.03 
          
Dowa  5.00 95.00  0.90  1.00  88.10 
          













        
Source:  farmer focus group discussions, October 2008.  
 
 
The findings in this section lead to a few summary observations about the structure of maize 
production and markets in Malawi: 
 
  A relatively small fraction of total maize production is marketed, especially in a 
drought year.  Malawi’s maize market can be characterized as being extremely thin, 
with minor changes in production leading to large changes in marketed supplies.  This 
“thinness” is the result of farm structure, with a relatively small number of farmers in 
Malawi selling grain, and with the volumes they sell fluctuating with the harvest. 
  These supply fluctuations contribute to high price instability due to an elasticity of 
demand for grain that is believed to be very inelastic.  In a good year, marketed output 
rises while demand falls, putting downward pressure on prices.  In a poor harvest 
year, marketed output shrinks while demand rises.  This means that small changes in 
production generally lead to large price changes. 
  A very small fraction of households account for most of the maize marketed from 
domestic production in Malawi.  
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  Most farm households do not sell maize, because of numerous constraints on 
production – inadequate landholding size to produce a surplus, little ability to afford 
fertilizer, sub-optimal use of available inputs due to limited knowledge, etc.  
  Private buyers were the main buyer of maize from smallholders selling maize, 
accounting for roughly 75% of all maize sold.  Intra-village sales accounted for 17% 
while ADMARC accounted for 8%.  
 
 
3.2  Consumers  
 
According to the Government of Malawi (2006), adults 10 years and above need 270kg of 
maize per year and children about 135kg per annum.  While this may reflect “requirements”, 
actual maize consumption is much lower for most of the population.  The Government of 
Malawi (2006) estimates that actual daily caloric intake is 2,366 kcal per person per day and 
that roughly 55% of total caloric intake is from maize.  Maize has 3578 calories per kg.  From 
this, it is estimated that per capita consumption requirements are in the range of: 
 
2,366 kcal/day * 365 days/year *0.45 ÷ 3,578 = 108.6 kgs maize per person per year 
 
This relatively low number may reflect low purchasing power and under-nutrition among a 
large proportion of the Malawian population, as well as the potential for increased 
consumption of other staple foods in recent years, such as cassava, rice and wheat.  
 
If it is assumed that maize accounts for more like 55% of total caloric intake, this would 
suggest that annual maize requirements are more in the range of 133 kgs maize per person.  
 
Table 7 presents estimates of national maize purchases from available marketed supply.  We 
include purchases of maize grain and maize meal by urban and rural consumers, and demand 
by brewers, the livestock and poultry industry, and producers of packaged maize meal.  Table 
7 disaggregates human maize purchases into rural vs. urban.  Urban consumption estimates 
are based on the computations above, roughly 110 to 130kgs per person per year.
2  We also 
assume that consumption increases slightly in a good production year when prices are 
generally relatively low, reflecting a negative price elasticity of demand.  Based on 
information from local sources, it is estimated that many urban households acquire about half 
of their maize from their own farms, relatives in rural areas and other intra-household 
transfers, indicating that only about 50% of urban consumers’ maize consumption is in the 
form of purchases from markets.   Based on these parameters, it is estimated that the quantity 
of maize and maize meal purchased by urban consumers is in the range of 70,000 to 110,000 
tons per year, depending on the season.  
 
Key informant interviews of traders and processors in Malawi indicate that the demand for 
maize by brewers, livestock and poultry feeders, and maize millers is in the vicinity of 30,000 
tons in a normal year, rising to 40,000 tons in a year of low maize prices, and 20,000 tons in a 
year of high prices.  
 
The percentage of the rural population purchasing maize and the amounts purchased are also 
shown in Table 7.  The information needed to compute maize consumption is (a) the 
population in rural areas; (b) the proportion of the population purchasing maize in a given 
year; (c) mean kgs purchased per person per year. These estimates suggest that the quantity of 
                                                 
2 If the goal of this exercise were to estimate “consumption requirements” rather than to estimate actual market 
flows based on effective demand, the national maize requirements would be substantially greater than shown in 
Table 6.   
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maize purchased by rural households greatly exceeds that of urban areas, ranging from 
150,000 in a good harvest year to 500,000 tons per year in a drought year.   
 
Table 7.  Estimates of maize purchased from markets for human food consumption.  
  Poor harvest  Average harvest  Good harvest 
Rural:  
   
  Population (millions)  11.94 (88.5%) 
  % of population purchasing 
  Maize  85% 65% 50% 
  Mean kgs purchased per person 
  (among households purchasing)  50kg 40kg 25kg 
  Total maize purchases  
  (tons per annum)   507,450 310,440 149,250 
     
Urban:      
  Population (millions)  1.55 (11.5%) 
  % of urban maize consumption 
from   65% 50%  40% 
  Mean kgs purchased per person  100 – 110 kg  110-120 kg  120-130 kg 
  Total maize purchases  
  (tons per annum)   100,750 – 110,825  85,250 – 93,000  74,400 – 80,600 
         
Animal feed + brewer industry 
purchases (tons per annum)  20,000 30,000  40,000 
      
National quantity of maize 
purchased (tons):   628,200 – 638,275  425,690 – 433,440  263,650 – 269,850 
National quantity of maize 
supplied, as per Table 5 (tons)   241,000  491,000  580,000 
National maize surplus (deficit)   (-387,200) to (-397,275)  65,310 to 57,560  316,350 to 310,150 
Sources:   
  population: Malawi Government, 2006 
  % of rural population purchasing maize (from 2007 AISS survey by NSO);  
  estimates of urban population purchasing maize from key informant interviews, October 2008.  
 
Note that these figures presented in Table 7 are based on estimated consumption quantities, 
not consumption requirements.  Estimated market purchases based on “recommended daily 
intake” would be substantially higher.   
 
After subtracting the national quantity of maize purchased from the quantity of maize 
supplied from domestic production, we arrive at the estimated national maize surplus (deficit) 
as shown in the last row of Table 7.  In a good production year, and given official production 
estimates, it is estimated that Malawi would have a marketed surplus of over 300,000 tons in 
a good season, a surplus of 50,000 to 70,000 tons in an average season, and a deficit of over 
300,000 tons in a poor production season.  However, data presented in the next section 
indicate that Malawi has been a net importer of maize in three of the past four years since the 
implementation of the Agricultural Inputs Support Programme, giving some rationale for 
reconsideration of the production and/or consumption figures.   
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3.3  Maize Imports to Malawi 
 
Informal maize imports from Malawi’s regional neighbors since the initiation of the 
Agricultural Inputs Subsidy Programme are estimated by FEWSNet to be in the range of 
50,000 to 100,000 tons, again depending on the harvest.  Imports tend to be relatively high in 
a drought year and relatively low in a good production season, although this of course also 
depends on the harvest situation in the neighboring countries, especially Mozambique and 
Tanzania.   
 
Informal maize imports from Mozambique, Zambia, and Tanzania are the other major source 
of maize supplies in Malawi.  The Famine Early Warning System monitors 12 border 
crossings with Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia and estimates the maize crossing across 
these border areas each month since July 2004.  According to FEWSNET (2010), informal 
net maize inflows from these countries are as shown in Table 8.  Net inflows are defined as 
imports minus exports.  Malawi has been a net maize importer in relation to neighboring 
countries in every month since the informal cross-border trade monitoring was established in 
July 2004.  
 
Table 8.  Informal net cross-border maize imports to Malawi, 2004/05 to 2009/10 
marketing seasons 
  Informal cross-border net imports from:  Formal net imports from: 
Marketing 
year 
Tanzania Zambia Mozambique Total  informal 
cross border net 
imports 
Zimbabwe South  Africa 
  -------------------------- metric tons -------------------------- 
2004/05* 2,656  2,157  71,229  76,042    58 
2005/06 83,918  338  71,085  155,341    127,356 
2006/07 -1,040  176 76,803  75,939    2,552 
2007/08 -508  721  52,323  52,536  -302,000  2,492 
2008/09 2,671  5,259  54,020  61,950    39,077 
2009/10** 413  5,284 44,701 50,398**    Na 
Average (2004/05 to 2008/09) net imports to Malawi  84,362 34,307 
Average (2004/05 to 2008/09) percentage of total 
Malawian imports from:  71.4% 
 
28.6% 
Notes:  Years cover the period April to March. net imports refers to imports minus exports.  *2004/05 covers 
July-March period only. **covers the period April-October 2009.  
Source:  FEWSNET 2010.  
 
The last column of Table 8 also shows maize imports from South Africa.  This information 
comes from the South Africa Revenue System, which records the quantity and value of 
goods, including maize grain, crossing the South Africa border to other countries in the 
region.  In only two years, 2005/06 and 2008/09, were imports from South Africa of any size 
relative to the Malawi market.  Since the Malawi fertilizer subsidy programme was initiated 
in the 2005/06 crop year (corresponding to the 2006/07 marketing year), total maize imports 
to Malawi have been between 50,000 tons in 2007/08 to roughly 100,000 tons in 2008/09, 
which represents from 8.6% to 41.2% of the total quantity of maize marketed from domestic 
production as estimated in Table 5.
3  The Government of Malawi did contract to export 
400,000 tons of maize to Zimbabwe under the assumption that the country had a surplus in 
2007/08 of over 1 million tons, but traders could not find enough maize to fulfill the 
contracts, and in the end roughly 302,000 tons were exported in 2007/08 (Chirwa, 2009). The 
                                                 
3 In a good production year when imports are relatively low, we compute the ratio of imports to domestic 
marketed supply as 50,000 / 580,000 as shown in the last row of Table 4 (good season scenario).  In a poor 
production year when imports are relatively high, we compute this ratio as 100,000 / 241,000 also shown in the 
last row of Table 4 (poor season scenario).    
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exporting of maize in 2007/08 is believed to have led to the significant price escalation 
observed in the 2007/08 marketing season, in which maize prices exceeded $450 per ton 
(Minde et al., 2008; Dorward et al., 2009).  The government export of maize to Zimbabwe 
caused it to be a net maize exporter in 2007/08; but in the other three marketing years of the 
AISP (2006/07, 2008/09 and 2009/10), the country appears to have been a net maize 
importer.  
 
However, the evidence that Malawi has been a net maize importer in three of the four years 
of AISP implementation contrasts with official production estimates and consumption 
estimates showing Malawi to have exportable maize surplus of 50,000 to 350,000 tons in an 
average and good year, respectively.  This may be an indication that either the consumption 
estimates are too low or the official maize production and marketed output estimates are too 
high.  The appearance of an exportable surplus based on the production and consumption 
estimates, despite the fact that the country has been a net maize importer according to trade 
data raises concerns that either the production data are overestimated, and/or that 





4.  MAIZE PRICE MOVEMENTS 
 
This section examines maize price patterns in Malawi, the relationship between market prices 
and ADMARC selling prices, and the relationship between price movements and trade flows.  
 
Malawi’s agricultural system, being heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture, is highly 
prone to adverse weather conditions such as drought and floods.  Frequent unfavorable 
weather conditions leads to some of the maize price surges observed in Malawi shown in 
Figure 1.  Major price spikes are observed in 2001/02, 2005/06, 2007/08, and 2008/09.  These 
first two episodes were associated with drought in 2001 and 2005.  The price spikes of 
2007/08 and 2008/09 are more difficult to explain considering that official production 
statistics indicate that both years were associated with good harvests, the 2007 harvest being 
a historic production record. Chirwa (2009) attributes the high prices in 2008/09 to price 
transmission from world markets to Malawi, yet ironically world prices declined sharply 
from their highs in July 2008 to near normal levels by November 2008 and thereafter.  
However, food prices particularly in southern Malawi remained at extremely high levels 
throughout 2008 and 2009 until the 2009 harvest in May.  After accounting for transport 
costs, the landed cost of maize imported from South Africa was significantly below prices in 
southern Malawi during late 2008 and the first 4 months of 2009.  Interviews with grain 
traders during this period indicated that several traders applied for import licenses but were 
these applications were not approved.
4  Meanwhile, according to the South African Revenue 
Systems (SARS), Malawi imported roughly 39,000 tons from South Africa, although the 
firm(s) responsible for the imports is not specified.  Apparently this volume of imports was 
not sufficient to prevent the major price spike observed in late 2008/early 2009.  
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Source:  Ministry of Agriculture price monitoring reports, SAFEX.  
 
 
                                                 
4 Private traders are required to obtain an import or export license from government to engage in international 
trade in maize (Chirwa 2009).   
19
The bottom half of Figure 2 shows nominal maize market prices in Lilongwe and Lunzu (a 
major market outside of Blantyre) as well as the ADMARC maize selling price in nominal 
kwacha per kg.  Market prices are generally above the ADMARC selling price except in very 
good production years, like that of the 2006 and 2007 harvests.  If ADMARC had sufficient 
quantities to sell to meet demand, it is unlikely that market prices would exceed the 
ADMARC price, as people needing grain would simply acquire their grain from ADMARC.  
Hence when market prices greatly exceed ADMARC prices for prolonged periods, this is 
likely to reflect periods of tight supplies and rationing at ADMARC depots.  According to 
Figure 2, there are four distinct periods during which market prices exceeded ADMARC 
prices for prolonged periods.  These are the 2001/02 famine year in Malawi, the months 
following the 2005 drought, the period from late 2007 to mid-2008 and again during late 
2008 into early 2009.   
 
Figure 2.  Maize market prices and ADMARC selling price (in nominal kwacha per kg) 
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The official estimate of a record maize harvest in 2007 might have been expected to result in 
an abundance of maize and relatively low prices, benefiting urban consumers and most of the 
rural poor, who are typically net buyers of maize.  In light of the estimated 1.1 million ton 
maize surplus based on the official 2007 production estimate, the Malawi government in 
early 2007 contracted with the Government of Zimbabwe to export 400,000 tons of maize to 
Zimbabwe. However, by the end of 2007, the government had exported only 283,000 tons 
and then suspended further exports due to a rapid escalation in domestic market prices. 
Within several months after the harvest, maize prices soared over $400 per ton, exceeded 
only in the major crisis year of 2001/2 and the drought year of 2005/06 (Figure 1).  Maize 
prices in late 2007/early 2008 were $100 to $150 per ton higher in Malawian markets than in  
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other regional markets during the same period. These outcomes are difficult to reconcile with 
the official estimates of a record maize harvest of 3.4 million tons in 2007.   
 
As mentioned earlier, the price spike in 2008/09 appears to be due to restrictions on maize 





5.  ORGANIZATION AND BEHAVIOR OF MALAWI’S MAIZE MARKETING SYSTEM 
 
Maize moves from a large and highly differentiated group of farmers through an equally 
diverse group of primary assemblers and transporters, before reaching the silos and 
warehouses of the major actors in the supply chain and eventually the consumer.  A large 
proportion of grain goes through the marketing system without being handled by the large 
trading and processing firms. This includes both tied exchanges between farmers and 
consumers associated with ganyu labor as well as marketed maize that is handled by small- 
and medium-sized traders to small retailers and consumers.  As such, there are many different 
transaction points within the chain, many of which overlap and feed into one another (see 
market flow diagram at the end of this section). What follows is a description of the actors in 
the chain, beginning with the stage linking producers to the market and ending with 




5.1  Farmer marketing options 
 
Rural regions within Malawi tend to center around rural market areas. These market areas 
may be highly developed, with permanent buying points, including private assemblers and 
ADMARC, which operate daily throughout the year. These markets may also have a specific 
market day, which attracts mobile traders (traders owning a truck) seeking to buy directly 
from farmers. These markets may also attract seasonal buyers who are acting as agents for 
large trading companies. In contrast, other rural regions are centered upon markets with set 
market days, which are open 1-3 days a week and attract itinerant maize traders and local 
buyers from around the region.  
 
Activity within these markets varies seasonally and regionally. For example, in regions 
dominated by poor smallholders, such as Chisinka Village near Mulanje, farmers tend to 
market their maize early, with the hopes that other livelihood strategies, like ganyu labor, will 
support them through the lean season.  Consequently, traders tend to focus their efforts in 
these regions early in the marketing season.  Conversely, poor smallholders that grow both 
tobacco and maize, such as in Matziyada Village, Dowa District, are able to live off of the 
proceeds from tobacco immediately after harvest and therefore hold maize until later in the 
season.  Larger surplus producers, like those found in Chioshsya, Mchinji District, sell maize 
within their local market to both local traders and company agents, at various stages of the 
year. Generally, they sell maize in July and then again just before the planting season (around 
November) to buy production inputs.  Traders interviewed in high production rural market 
areas like Madisi and Bowe confirm that maize sales are highest early in the year, as poorer 
producers sell their stocks for cash needs, and later in the season as larger producers prepare 
for the coming farming season. Early sales are also important for farmers seeking to buy 
chemicals to treat their maize. Larger scale farmers, those marketing 200-300 bags of maize, 
can spend up to K35,000 on treatment chemicals. Some poorer respondents stated that they 
sold maize to local buyers and to ADMARC to avoid paying for treatment costs, with the 
expectation of buying that maize back later in the season. For them, the price differential they 
pay is the cost of storage.  
 
At the primary assembler level, Malawi’s maize market is characterized by a relatively high 
degree of competition, though there are significant regional differences, and a wide 
geographic scope. Recent efforts by the Government of Malawi to improve rural 
infrastructure has made many locations accessible throughout the year, while costs of 
transporting maize from rural areas to urban markets have probably been lowered 
considerably (analysis is underway to determine if this is reflected in spatial price spreads).  
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Based on our research, private maize traders do a good job of reaching even the more remote 
parts of Malawi. In all 18 areas where the field work was conducted, farmers were not able to 
provide accurate data on the numbers of traders that serviced farmers in their village; all 
respondents stated that “there were too many to count.” While farmers, particularly the 
poorest, complain about the prices they are offered early in the marketing season, none 
complained that they lacked a market. While some farmers complained that they were forced 
to take the price offered to them by a trader because there was no other local option at the 
time they wanted to sell, others within the same group seemed to be able to find a better 
market for their maize at the same time of the year as those who complained about a lack of 
options. This indicates that a particular farmer’s initiative and “savvy” plays a role in market 
access, suggesting some scope for training in farmer marketing skills.  
 
Marketing options available for farmers vary based on their production levels and distance 
from either rural or urban markets. For farmers in more isolated regions, their primary 
marketing options are mobile traders who come to periodic regional markets and traders 
with bicycles who buy small quantities of maize. Hiring transport to take products to a 
market does not seem to be an option considered by most farmers. Farmers located closer to 
established rural market centers have a wider range of marketing options, including 
permanent  local buyers, agents for large trading companies, mobile buyers, and 
ADMARC.  
 
In July/August 2009, focus group discussions of farmers who sold maize since the 2009 
harvest were carried out in 6 districts.  One of the purposes of the FGDs was to assess the 
maize selling options available to smallholder farmers and the degree of competition among 
assembly traders.  Mvula et al 2003 report that traders have monopoly power in their local 
markets and do not face intense competition.   
 
One of the questions asked of farmers in the FGDs was “since the 2009 harvest, how many 
traders have come into this village to buy maize from farmers in this village?” Results 
indicate wide variations across villages, with no major differences being observed between 
remote villages (>20km from market town) and accessible villages (<20km from market 
town).  The median number of traders serving these villages was 10-15, with a couple 
villages reporting as few as 2-3 traders, while other villages reported well over 50 traders 
coming to their village to buy maize. These figures are believed to be farmers’ indication of 
the total number of traders operating in their villages in an entire year. After the main buying 
season of May-July, it is likely that the number of traders operating in the villages declines 
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During the farmer focus group discussions, farmers were asked to provide individual-specific 
information concerning their largest maize sales transaction from the 2009/10 season.  One of 
the questions concerned the distance traveled from their farm to the point of maize sale.  
Figures 4a-f show the frequencies of kilometer distance for villages in surveyed districts 
considered accessible (less than 15km from a tarmac road and retail market town) and remote 
(more than 15km from a tarmac road and retail market town).  The average distance traveled 
from the farm to point of maize sale was 3.7 km.  Perhaps surprisingly, farmers in remote 
areas travelled a shorter distance from their farms to the point of maize sale on average than 
farmers in accessible villages.  This is because some farmers in accessible areas chose 
deliberately to travel to a larger market town to market their grain, whereas this was a more 
expensive option for farmers in relatively inaccessible areas.  In the remote areas, the median 
distance travelled from the farm to point of maize sale was zero, indicating that traders move 
through the villages to buy grain directly from farmers’ fields or homes.  Combining this 
information on distance traveled with the information in figures 3a-c indicating that roughly 
10-15 traders came into the village to buy maize from farmers, the picture emerges that 
farmers in the surveyed districts had a variety of options for selling their maize within fairly 
short distances from their farms.  
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Figure 4a.  Household reported distance from farm to point of maize sale, 




























Figure 4b.  Household reported distance from farm to point of maize sale, 



























Figure 4c.  Household reported distance from farm to point of maize sale, 
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Figure 4d.  Household reported distance from farm to point of maize sale,  
































Figure 4e.  Household reported distance from farm to point of maize sale, 





























Figure 4f.  Household reported distance from farm to point of maize sale, 





























5.2 Trading firms 
 
Small-scale traders  
 
The local maize assemblers were the main marketing option for smallholder farmers in all the 
sites visited during the study. These small-scale assemblers started buying maize in April. 
They go to the villages to purchase grain after harvest. Such traders either construct 
makeshift shades or hang their scales on a pair of poles to purchase maize from farmers. In 
certain situations, such traders move from farmer to farmer in search of grain. This saves the  
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farmer the trouble of arranging transport to an organized market.  However, the farmer may 
be at a disadvantage in bargaining unless he knows what other possible buyers would offer.   
 
Each small-scale trader was able to buy 5-15MT from producing areas.  Their purchased 
quantities are constrained primarily by their access to working capital, and by the size of the 
trucks they use and road quality (which determines the size of truck that can be used to 
assemble grain. Small trade volumes keep trading costs relatively high.  Marketing costs 
could be reduced by better road infrastructure to accommodate larger trucks and by greater 
access to working capital. Most claim that their biggest obstacle is a lack of capital, which 
forces them to survive on small margins taken from the constant turnover of stocks. These 
traders rarely hold maize longer than it takes to find a market.   
 
Local buyers located in rural markets like Chikuli, Bowe, Chioshya, and Bua buy and sell 
maize throughout the year.  Their markets vary throughout the year. From June to November, 
they sell most of their maize to mobile traders who come to rural markets to buy maize for 
large traders and  processors. This trade diminishes as the planting season approaches, 
which forces them to shift their focus to meet growing local demand. These traders buy maize 
from a variety of sources, including directly from farmers and bicycle traders. They deal in 
various volumes, from buckets to multiple bags depending on their economic strength. They 
will also buy maize from large trading companies or traders in surplus areas if local 
supplies diminish. As such, these local traders are considered to be a reliable source of maize 
by rural residents even in lean years and during lean seasons.  All rural markets we visited 
had at least one of these traders, while Bowe and Chioshya had up to eight.  It was difficult to 
gauge the quantities of maize these traders would buy and sell throughout the year, but based 
on the current stocks they holding, most operated in the range of 50-300 bags of maize at a 
time. Storage did not seem to be a constraint for these traders, since most rural markets had 
several houses available for rent that were capable of holding up to 500 bags of maize. Many 
of these traders lack their own transport and are therefore dependent on mobile 
traders/transporters to link them with large-scale buyers in urban areas. The small-scale 
traders sell directly to consumers, ADMARC, medium-scale traders and large traders 
depending on situations and locations. 
 
Small-scale traders’ prices tended to be higher than ADMARC prices.  In 2008, many small 
traders indicated that when they raised their prices ADMARC followed suit. In Chilipa EPA, 
the ADMARC price was MK30/kg when the traders were already buying at MK40/kg in May 
and MK60/kg in July and August. The larger traders by contrast indicated that ADMARC 
was the price leader and traders altered their prices in response to ADMARC. Still other 
traders felt that they did not have to match ADMARC’s price in order to still get most of the 
surplus grain from farmers.  This is because the traders paid cash promptly and were 
perceived by most farmers interviewed as being more honest with their weighing scales.  As 
one trader from Lunzu market said “I don’t fear buying in areas where ADMARC operates”.  
 
Some small-scale traders in the border districts of Mulanje and Mchinji also buy some maize 
from across the border to bring into Malawi. This is actually more common in Mulanje, 
which is located near a border trading center called Mpala in the town of Muloza The small 
traders in Mulanje purchase two to three bags of maize per time and transport them to their 
warehouses using bicycles. The maize was bought from Mozambique at MK20/kg in 
February but the price later rose to MK60/kg from September to October.  In fact, in October, 
2008, traders interviewed in Mulanje said that maize was more expensive in Mozambique 
than in Malawi (3,000 MK per 50 kg in MZ and 2700 in Malawi). 
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Medium-scale traders  
 
Medium-scale traders usually trader 500-2000 tons of maize per year and are often found in 
major trading centres such as Madisi or Bowe, Lunzu, Chitakale or Mchinji.  Usually they are 
linked to small assemblers in the producing areas who act as their agents to buy maize from 
farmers. These traders buy maize from farmers and small scale traders until they have enough 
to fill a reasonably large truck or a mobile trader comes and offers an attractive price.  The 
medium-scale traders sell to large traders such as ADMARC, Mulli Brothers, Rafik, NFRA, 
and processors such as Chibuku Products, and Rab Processors or animal feed manufacturers 
such as Central Poultry, Feltons, and Multifoods. Since medium-scale traders communicate 
regularly with the larger traders they know the prevailing maize prices at national level. 
 
Medium scale traders are quite flexible in the geographic scope of their purchasing areas, 
often moving maize across districts from surplus to deficit areas. For example, a medium 
scale trader in Lunzu, Blantyre District sources maize from locations as diverse as Ncheu, 
Lililongwe, and Kasungu Districts. These medium-scale traders sometimes set up their own 
buying points to acquire maize directly from farmers but more frequently buy from small 
assemblers. This usually happens from May to October.  However, these traders are always 
active in rural markets and they are always buying and selling maize, from both farmers and 
small-scale traders (bicycle traders).  
 
The medium-scale traders have good access to transport and storage facilities.  Some have 
their own transport while others rely on “mobile buyers” i.e., truckers who are contracted by 
larger warehousers and large trading companies to purchase from small/medium scale traders 
in rural markets. Mobile traders (typically agents of the large trading companies) frequent 
rural markets and buy maize from medium-scale traders who are consolidating maize from 
farmers and bicycle traders. Maize collected by these traders will move immediately to 
warehouses or processing plants.  During the course of the field work, we spoke with one 
transporter who was buying 10 tons of maize for Mulli Brothers, but was delivering it directly 
to ADMARC silos in Lilongwe.  We also spoke to two private entrepreneurs who owned 8 
trucks between the two of them. These trucks were used to move maize for their companies. 
These mobile traders serve as the primary link between rural market areas, serviced by local 
buyers, and national warehouses.  
  
Large scale traders 
 
The big wholesale traders in Malawi include Mulli Brothers, Transglobe, Farmers World, 
RAB, Export Trading, and Rafik. These firms flourish because of their relatively high skills, 
know-how, connections, and access to relatively low-cost capital.  
 
The large private traders get their maize from a variety of sources. In certain cases, the maize 
comes from medium scale traders and from neighboring countries particularly Mozambique 
and Zambia. These traders tend to have a good network of traders either medium or small-
scale within Malawi and across the border who assist them in identifying available supplies 
and in bulking such supplies in economic lots for transportation to their warehouses. 
Sometimes the larger traders set up their own buying points in major producing areas to 
purchase maize directly from farmers. For example, in Mulanje, Mulli Brothers, Export 
Produce and Rafik bought maize directly from farmers from June to September. The large 
traders gave the farmers a price of MK25/kg in April and MK30-MK40/kg in June/July. The 
large traders often buy maize to meet contract requirements from the National Food Reserve 
Agency (NFRA), World Food Program (WFP), Non-Governmental Organizations, processors 
and institutions. A single contract for these traders is about 1,000MT. Large traders have 
good warehousing facilities, either rented or owned in Lilongwe, and Blantyre cities.  
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Some of these large traders have contracts with the Government of Malawi through National 
Food Reserve Agency (NFRA), and some international agencies such as World Food 
Program, other Non Governmental Organizations and Faith Based Organization (Kadale, 
2007). Wholesalers after consolidating the maize, they clean it, and transport it directly to 
customer. 
 
Changes in the number of maize traders over past 5 years 
 
The focus group discussions of smallholder farmers almost unanimously indicated that there 
has been a noticeable increase in the number of small traders buying maize in their villages.  
In some focus group discussions, farmers laughed at the question “how many traders buy 
maize in this village” because there were so many.  Some people tried to "ballpark" the figure 
at 30-40 small traders, however, this number cannot be considered very reliable.  In any case, 
there was a strong consensus among farmers that there were many traders from whom to 
choose to sell one’s maize.  This doesn’t necessarily mean that farmers felt positively about 
the traders and the way they were treated, yet competition did not seem to be the problem.  
 
In addition to farmers, we also asked traders about the changes in the number of traders 
operating in the market.  We asked specifically about small, medium, and large scale traders.  
For all traders, millers, and stockfeeders interviewed, we asked them to indicate on a 1 to 5 
scale how the number of marketing actors has changed over the past 5 years (1=substantial 
decline; 3=no change; 5=substantial increase).  These participants indicated that there has 
been a major rise in the number of small-scale traders over the past 5 years (mean score of 
4.7 over all market participants interviewed).  The number of medium-scale traders was also 
perceived to have risen over the past 5 years (score of 4.2).  By contrast, traders felt that the 
number of large-scale traders had actually declined slightly over the past 5 years (score of 
2.8).  The 2007 government tender for maize export appears to have contributed to a greater 
number of medium-scale traders in operation.  Several traders interviewed indicated that they 
got into the business in 2007 to respond to the government’s tender for maize contracts.  
However, a few of the firms entering in 2007 indicated that they were not seriously engaged 
in maize trading in 2008.  
 
 
5.3  Maize processors and animal feeders 
 
The main processors and manufacturers mentioned by farmers and traders were food 
processors such as Rab Processors, Chibuku Products, and animal feed processors such as 
Central Poultry, Feltons and Multifoods. Rab Processors is engaged in both processing and 
trading of maize. They process maize into maize flour, and other products such as Likuni 
Phala.  Bakarasa Milling in Blantyre works closely with Export Traders, who supplies grain 
for their milling operations. The processors obtain their requirements through the medium 
scale and large traders. Sometimes they buy directly from large-scale farmers who can supply 
economic loads to the processors. For cost-effectiveness and efficiency reasons, the 
processors often do not engage in setting up of their own buying points in the rural areas. 
 
There are many hammermills operating in rural areas.  It is common for small scale traders to 
be located near one of these hammermills to buy small quantities of maize from people who 
need cash to grind their maize. The hammermills also trade some maize, but according to 




5.4  Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation (ADMARC) 
 
ADMARC has historically been a major player in Malawi’s maize marketing system.  
Government has often used ADMARC to implement its smallholder-oriented pricing 
policies.  According to farmers interviewed, ADMARC’s role in the market has apparently 
declined in recent years, although data is not readily available to substantiate this.  
ADMARC’s annual maize purchases and sales figures were last published in 2002; in recent 
years, such data is considered confidential.  However, some substantiation of a decline in 
ADMARC’s role can be surmised from the fact that ADMARC had approximately 350 
depots spread throughout the country in 2002 (Kutengule, Nucifora and Zaman, 2006), while 
ADMARC staff interviewed in 2008 indicate that less than 70 depots were purchasing grain. 
However, any declining trend in ADMARC role was recently reversed in August 2008 when 
the Government announced a ban on private maize trade and re-established ADMARC as the 
exclusive legal buyer and seller of maize in Malawi.  
 
In the 2008/09 market year, ADMARC started to purchase maize from farmers late in the 
season, around June in some areas, July in others.
5  Because a large percentage of maize is 
marketed immediately after harvest, farmers therefore sold their maize mainly to private 
traders.  Moreover, farmers indicated that ADMARC offered slightly lower prices than 
private traders. For example, in Blantyre, farmers reported that when ADMARC was buying 
maize at MK30/kg private traders were already buying at MK60/kg in July/August. Farmers 
felt the MK60/kg price from private traders was acceptable because it enabled them to make 
some profit on their investments in chemicals and fertilizer. For this reason, farmers in 
Chilipa area in Blantyre sold much of their maize to private traders before ADMARC opened 
their markets.   
 
Farmers also indicated that ADMARC often runs out of money or stocks and this frustrates 
both farmers and consumers, and provides an opportunity for the private traders to 
consolidate their trading activities in areas hitherto dominated by ADMARC.   
 
In the current season, ADMARC has bought approximately 70,000MT. All the maize 
ADMARC has bought was delivered to its own markets for sale to households. According to 
ADMARC, approximately 70% of its purchases have come from smallholder farmers, 20% 
from medium/small-scale traders and 5% each from large-scale traders and large farmers. 
However, this figure stands in opposition to the data collected during field visits with 
farmers. Very few farmers interviewed in the five districts covered in the study sold to 
ADMARC, while myriad small-medium scale traders mentioned that they were forced to sell 
maize to ADMARC when the trading ban made it illegal for them to sell their maize to other 
traders.  Reports also indicate that one of the large-scale traders has negotiated an agreement 
with the government to continue operating despite the ban on private maize trade in order to 
buy maize from farmers and small traders in order to supply NFRA with maize.  This would 
suggest that the majority of ADMARC’s grain supplies in 2008 were directly or indirectly 
supplied by traders, not farmers.  Hence, the field work conducted for this study seems to 
have uncovered some discrepancies about the major source of ADMARC supplies.   
 
In the current season, ADMARC’s sales have been mainly to household consumers, although 
institutional buyers such as schools and prisons have also purchased maize from ADMARC. 
ADMARC has so far sold 10% of its maize and has approximately 63,000 tons still to be sold 
before the 2009 harvest.  
                                                 
5 As for the reasons why ADMARC tends to start buying several months after private traders, some interviews 
indicated that ADMARC waits till July when the grain is sufficiently dry to buy; others interviewed indicated 
that ADMARC was late in securing financing for purchasing maize.   
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From 2006 to date, ADMARC’s greatest difficulty is inadequate funds for buying grain. The 
rapid rise in maize prices in 2008 especially hurt ADMARC’s ability to buy grain because 
their limited funds ran out quickly in light of the higher price paid, and hence ADMARC was 
not able to buy as much grain as they had intended through the first 4-5 months of the 2008 
season. The price of maize went up before the ban because of competition from private 
traders. This increased the corporation’s expenses in maize procurement. Consequently 
ADMARC needed more funds to purchase the same quantity of maize it bought in the 
previous season. ADMARC therefore desperately needs to get loans from banks to make 
funds available for buying crops from farmers.  
 
Maize imported by private traders from neighboring countries has occurred every year since 
2004 when a monitoring system was put in place, but the volumes have yet to exceed 200,000 
tons.  In years of major maize deficits, the Government tends to be the main importer of 
maize, generally from South Africa.  When the government announces that it will import 
maize, this generally acts as a disincentive for wholesalers to engage in cross-border trade 
(RATES, 2003).  This is because the government generally sells maize at below the cost of 
importation, hence undermining the price at which private traders would be able to sell.  
 
 
5.5.  Retailers 
 
A two-way flow of grain occurs between wholesalers and small traders. The first one was that 
of first assembler-wholesaler whereby small traders are categorized as first assemblers who, 
after buying maize from farmers, sell to medium traders who are known as wholesalers.  
Later in the season, and especially in poor harvest years when rural demand for grain is high, 
the larger traders sell maize to small retail traders who sell to consumers.  Wholesalers have 
the capacity to store maize until late in the marketing season unlike first assemblers who just 
buy and sell due to limited capital and storage capacity. As such during lean period the 
former sells to the later who are in direct contact with the consumer. For example Mr. 
Kawana at Nathenje in Lilongwe does sell to small traders who sell to consumers at Nanjiri 
trading center. He also sells directly to consumers who come to his warehouses and shops.  
 
Interrelationship between retailers and consumers  
 
The last relationship observed on the maize trade flow in Malawi is that of retailer-consumer. 
These consumers are both small maize farmers (net buyers) and non-maize producers. The 
study has observed that the majority of buyers are grain-deficit rural households. Most of 
these farmers are the ones who sell maize very early in the season and by September most of 
them run out of food.  Eventually they tend to concentrate on the market for home 
consumption. The other consumers are individuals who do not grow maize. These consumers 
are typically found in major cities and towns like Lunzu in Blantyre, and in some trading 
centers like Madisi in Dowa, Chitakale in Mulanje, and Buwa in Mchinji. 
 
Urban consumers buy maize from ADMARC, from small scale venders, and directly from 
farmers/relatives in nearby rural areas. Urban consumers face the same constraints when 
dealing with ADMARC as their counterparts in rural areas. Buying from ADMARC can 
require standing in long queues, while there is no guarantee that the depot will have sufficient 
maize or that the measurement will be accurate. As such, many urban consumers buy from 
local venders, even though the price may be significantly higher. These venders can be 
differentiated based on size, volume, and business organization. Some venders contacted in 
Kawale market buy their maize directly from farmers and rural buyers for much of the year. 
They generally go directly to rural areas, buy maize, and then bring it to their small  
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warehouses. Like rural buyers, these venders operate with limited capital and do not store 
maize longer than needed to find a market. They generally deal in volumes ranging from 50-
300 bags. In markets like Kawale there were three such venders. These venders sell directly 
to consumers, small venders who sell into other urban markets, and large trading companies. 
They will also begin to buy maize from large private entrepreneurs when it becomes difficult 
to purchase maize in rural markets, around late December. Small venders who sell in markets 
like Chisapo and Chigwirizono sell directly to urban consumers, and purchase maize either 
from farmers on the outskirts of Lilongwe, from larger wholesale venders, such as those in 
Kawale, and large entrepreneurs.  
  
 
5.6  Storage  
 
While seasonal price rises are sometimes viewed as evidence of hoarding and profiteering, 
seasonal price rises in fact play a socially valuable function in ensuring food security.  The 
harvest comes only once a year, but humans must eat continuously throughout the year.  
Hence, storage from the harvest till the months directly preceding the new harvest is 
necessary.  Storage involves costs, mainly the costs of fumigation and storage chemicals, rent 
on the storage facilities, and interest charges on the inventory, and the cost of security to 
guard the warehouse.
6   Hence, maize prices must rise throughout the season to compensate 
people for storing the commodity at harvest.  An important question is how the rate at which 
prices rise through the year compares to actual storage costs. This question is beyond the 
scope of this study, but is addressed by Myers (2009) who finds evidence that seasonal price 
rises tend to rise roughly in line with storage costs, with some notable exceptions that are 
often due to trade policies and/or marketing board operations.  
 
During the interviews of traders, we asked about storage costs, and were given figures 
ranging from MK650/ton/month to MK1300/ton/month (USD4.60 to USD9.20 per month).  
Storage costs were relatively high in the urban areas of Lilongwe and Blantyre where rental 
costs were high.   
 
Small traders are typically not in a position to store their own maize because this requires 
access to finance.  Purchasing maize in bulk requires a loan, on which they must pay interest 
until they sell the maize and repay the loan.  Hence, small traders tend to sell maize soon after 
they have bought it.  Several exceptions were noted in Dowa but even there small traders 
stored only very small amounts for a month or two.  
 
However, for medium traders, maize is stored for longer periods in anticipation that the price 
would rise more so than storage costs.   
 
Table 9 shows monthly USD prices per ton in Lilongwe and the ratio of high to low price 
months, which amounts to the percentage increase over the season between high and low 
prices.  There is great variability in this ratio, indicating high risks of storage.  In the year 
when prices rose very dramatically (2001/02), this year was characterized by only a modest 
production shortfall, 8% below the country’s 10-year mean.  In September 2001, the grain 
trading parastatal, ADMARC, announced a fixed price for maize to be sold at its distribution 
centers and announced its intention to import maize from South Africa to defend this price 
(Rubey, 2004).  Because ADMARC’s selling price was considerably lower than the landed 
cost of importing maize, private traders had little incentive to import maize in this 
                                                 
6 The cost of buying 100 tons of maize from farmers at MK30/kg is MK 3 million (US22,000).  Hence, most 
traders generally must take out loans to buy grain in any significant scale.  For every month the trader stores 
grain, it delays the time he/she can repay the loan and hence interest charges accumulate.    
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environment.  However, the government imports arrived late and were not sufficient to meet 
demand.  As a result, ADMARC depots began to experience stock-outs, and prices soared 
over $450 per ton in early 2002.  The major price run-up in 2007/08 was also due to a 
complex combination of policy decisions combined with a likely overestimate of maize 




Table 9. Monthly retail maize prices, Lilongwe (USD per metric tonne) 
# months ratio of
Year Month between hi/lo month
May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr lo-hi price price
1994/95 96 104 116 111 92 67 71 95 103 103 91 69 -3 73%
1995/96 60 76 83 92 101 117 126 165 164 181 229 171 10 282%
1996/97 117 102 99 103 104 112 124 123 148 172 201 159 8 103%
1997/98 129 129 129 133 138 154 209 146 274 316 200 128 -2 147%
1998/99 103 110 117 96 118 183 200 212 235 263 163 103 6 174%
1999/00 104 101 107 104 121 112 140 140 130 163 164 107 9 62%
2000/01 74 42 61 71 70 58 83 80 94 100 104 83 9 148%
2001/02 71 81 98 222 290 269 275 338 515 496 400 182 8 625%
2002/03 160 170 185 151 150 153 170 231 160 213 216 180 3 54%
2003/04 99 109 98 84 87 92 80 81 96 141 186 186 4 133%
2004/05 165 150 165 150 244 150 161 168 170 159 167 159 3 63%
2005/06 155 164 192 162 164 242 272 267 266 269 405 267 10 161%
2006/07 148 149 147 151 156 152 176 180 180 161 146 136 -4 32%
2007/08 132 129 142 143 150 161 175 213 248 283 411 315 9 219%
2008/09 246 275 369 421 386 386
mean 115 115 124 127 142 144 162 174 199 216 220 160 5 163%
 
Source:  Ministry of Agriculture price reporting system.  Note:  2008/09 prices not counted in mean monthly 
price computation.  The last column in this table refers to the percentage by which the high month price exceeds 





Storage losses were estimated from samples collected in the target districts. Collected 
samples were analyzed at Bunda College Seed Technology Laboratory. The analysis involved 
first determining the moisture content of the maize and using conversion factors to bring the 
weight of 100 seeds to their standard 12.5% moisture content weight. The estimated weight 
was compared to a standard weight of 28-40g for 100 seeds. The difference in weight 
computed as a percentage was used as a rough estimate of storage losses.  Because the 
samples were taken during field work in October, the losses measured may underestimate the 
storage losses to be incurred over a full season.  Moreover, the method used here does not 
account for physical storage losses due to rodents.  However, since farm households 
continuously draw down their maize stocks over the season, the majority of their stocks will 
be consumed in the first few months after harvest.  Relatively little or none of a household’s 
stocks (in the case of households running out of their stocks prior to the next harvest) would 
be subjected to storage losses late in the season because there tends to be little maize left by 
that time.  Many if not most rural households run out of grain stocks after a few months.  
Hence, the methods used in this report to determine storage losses may only slightly 
underestimate mean storage losses if at all, particularly for the majority of households who 
run out of their stocks mid-way through the season.  Table 10 presents results of the mean 




Table 10.  Estimated mean percentage grain storage losses by district, 2008 
 
District  Farmer Level (%)  Trader level (%) 
Blantyre 12.20  21.67 
Mulanje 19.34  14.88 
Dowa 8.66  9.67 
Mchinji 14.53  12.16 
Average 13.68  14.60 
Overall average  14.14 
  
The overall storage loss is about 14%. The highest levels were among Blantyre and Mulanje 
traders. Mulanje farmers also have the highest losses in the southern Region while Mchinji 
farmers and traders had higher losses in the Center. These storage loss estimates reported by 
Bunda College researchers are lower than those reported by the government (over 30% loss). 
 
 
5.7   The system:  market channels and flows 
 
As maize moves from rural markets to national warehouses the number of actors contracts 
dramatically. While rural markets are characterized by a high degree of competition among 
buyers, the number of actors involved in warehousing and provisioning urban markets is 
remarkably small. This sector is dominated by the large trading companies, including Rab 
Brothers, Mulli Brothers, Transglobal, Export Trading, and Farmer’s World. Processing 
companies like Central Poultry and Chibuku Processing are also major actors in maize 
markets. In addition to these large companies, there are a handful of entrepreneurs who have 
the ability to buy and warehouse significant quantities of maize. I spoke with two of these 
buyers. One is currently holding 600 MT while the other has 1000 MT. Neither of these 
buyers could give me good figures on the number of entrepreneurs of a similar size operating 
in the market.  
 
Seasonality of market structure 
 
The importance of the various channels in Malawi’s maize marketing system changes 
according to the time of the season. These changes are driven by reliance on rain-fed 
agriculture, changes in market demand throughout the year, changes in prices, and costs of 
storage. Overall, the imposition of price bans and other regulations by the government this 
year made collecting data on the “normal” structure of Malawi’s maize extremely difficult. 
People have trouble describing their “normal” practices because there is so much variability 
and change in the markets, as well as production levels between years and within years.  
   
Post-Harvest Maize Market (April and May):  The maize harvest in Malawi begins in late 
April and continues through May. During this period of time producer prices for maize are at 
their lowest point of the year. These low prices are driven by a number of factors:  First, most 
of Malawi’s maize is produced by rain-fed agriculture. As a result, the majority of maize in 
the country is harvested at the same time, leading to a sharp rise in supply. Second, the high 
moisture content of maize marketed soon after harvest drives down the price, because maize 
traders factor moisture shrinkage into their buying price. Third, many of the producers 
marketing maize at this time are doing so out of desperation, making them price takers rather 
than price seekers.  Fourth, there is no official floor price, because ADMARC does not 
become active in the market until June.   
 
Most of the producers marketing maize during this period are doing so out of desperation. All 
maize producers understand that maize prices rise throughout the year. However, the need to  
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repay debts incurred during the farming season, the need to pay school fees, and other social 
obligations force small scale maize producers to sell their maize early in the marketing 
season. Yet not all small scale producers are the same. Some producers have alternative 
crops, like tobacco, which provide them with income early in the harvest period, therefore 
allowing them to hold maize until prices appreciate. Additionally, some farmers produce 
significant surplus, which allows them to sell maize strategically throughout the year, 
releasing some early in the season and holding some to sell later as the farming season 
approaches.  
 
The primary assemblers who are active during this period of time include: small scale traders 
on bicycles, local buyers in rural markets, mobile buyers coming from urban centers to buy in 
rural markets, and agents buying for large trading companies in rural markets. It is difficult to 
estimate the relative volumes of maize passing through each of these channels. Overall it 
seems that the quantities of maize being marketed by individual farmers is relatively small, 
since farmers who produce large surpluses hold these surpluses until prices rise later in the 
year. Thus, this period of time is characterized by numerous maize sales by a large number of 
producers, some of whom expect to buy maize back later in the season. These numerous, 
small sales are then assembled by these various buyers, who then sell their stocks to large 
scale traders and maize processors. No primary assemblers interviewed for this study stated 
that they hold maize to sell later in the year. Rather, these primary assemblers gain a margin 
by bulking maize that is sold in small quantities and then selling it on to large scale traders. 
Selling to large scale traders can either occur directly, whereby the primary assembler 
organizes his/her own transport or indirectly, whereby the assembler sells to a mobile buyer 
who buys from several primary assemblers until filling a truck. There are also a handful of 
private entrepreneurs, as well as large scale trading companies, who have their own buyers 
located in rural markets. Unlike the marketing structure later in the year, there is little or no 
local demand for maize during this time of the year. The majority of maize that is sold during 
this time period goes to large companies, though there is a handful of local small scale traders 
who buy small quantities of maize that they will sell back to rural people later in the year.   
 
Overall there is a high level of competitiveness at both the primary assembler and 
wholesaler/large scale trader level during this time of the year.  Some of this competition is 
driven by trading companies competing to acquire as much maize as possible before 
ADMARC sets a floor price in June. This seems to lead to a relatively quick appreciation in 
maize prices throughout this period. However, this is not a linear appreciation. Instead, a 
person’s ability to negotiate prices with primary assemblers or their proximity to rural 
markets, where a number of primary assemblers operate side-by-side, leads to variations in 
producer prices. As a result, producers who sold maize in the same area at roughly the same 
time may receive significantly different prices for their maize (sometimes 5-10 kwacha per 
kg difference).  
 
The market channels and structure of the market during this initial period of the marketing 
season is represented in Figure 5.   
 
The entrance of ADMARC: June to August:  The maize market in Malawi changes 
dramatically in June when ADMARC enters the market (Figure 6).  According to traders, 
ADMARC’s presence in the market has a significant affect on price, since traders must now 
compete with each other as well as the State to acquire maize. During this period of time 
primary assemblers communicate with large scale traders, informing them of ADMARC’s 
prices and activities. These primary assemblers are generally encouraged to offer farmers 
prices slightly higher than those offered by ADMARC. Farmers generally agree that traders 
offer them better prices than ADMARC. As a result of the competition between traders and 
ADMARC, prices tend to rise quickly during this period. It also appears that volumes of  
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marketed maize increase early in this period, as farmers start to market larger surpluses, 
producer prices are higher, and cash generated from crops like tobacco dries up. The volumes 
of marketed maize may then taper off, because many surplus maize producers will hold 
maize off the market until the farming season approaches. Overall, the majority of maize 
marketed during this period goes through primary assemblers, who then sell to large 
wholesalers/traders, though a minority of producers will sell directly to ADMARC. The 
reason for this flow pattern is due in part to the price differential between private buyers and 
ADMARC, but equally important is the convenience of selling to a private buyer rather than 
to ADMARC. Private traders will often buy directly from the farmer’s “doorstep” and always 
have cash to make purchases. Conversely, when selling to ADMARC farmers have to 
transport their maize to the depot, where they may find that the depot manager has run out of 
money to purchase maize.  Of course the tendency for maize to flow into private channels 
may change depending on the year. There are times when ADMARC offers a better price 
than private buyers, which has the effect of redirecting maize into ADMARC warehouses. 
Because of ADMARC’s limited reach, it is mostly primary assemblers, not farmers, who sell 
maize to ADMARC. However, due to their regular interactions with large scale maize buyers, 
these primary assemblers may be more price sensitive than many farmers, and generally have 
the luxury of being price seekers rather than price takers. Because of this structure, coupled 
with ADMARC’s limited flexibility in buying price and the inconvenience associated with 
selling to them, the majority of maize acquired during this time is channeled from producers, 
through primary assemblers, to large scale traders. Again, the demand for maize by rural 
consumers is still relatively low during this period, meaning that most if not all maize is 
channeled out of rural regions.  
 
Preparation for the farming season: September to November:  This is the lead up to the 
farming season. Many larger scale maize producers have held significant quantities of maize 
off the market with the expectation that prices will be higher during this period than in 
previous periods, thus lowering the relative cost of inputs. During this period there is 
normally an up-swing in maize sales, as farmers prepare for the coming farming season. 
Again, the structure of the market is essentially the same. Farmers sell to primary assemblers, 
who then turn and sell to large scale traders and wholesalers, though some will sell to 
ADMARC if the price ADMARC offers is good or if large scale traders have scaled back 
their purchasing. Additionally, some warehousers scale back their purchases during this time, 
because they have stockpiled maize early in the season to sell during the lean period, and may 
run out of warehouse space by this time. This may translate into a shrinking market for 
primary assemblers. There is also an increase in local demand during this period, as more and 
more rural households run out of their own maize supplies. While much of this demand is 
met through farmer to farmer exchanges, some is met through purchases from primary 
assemblers.  
 
Lean period December to March:  Figure 7 shows the main market channels and flows during 
the hungry season of December to March.  Most farmers have already marketed their maize 
by this time, though some do hold maize to use to hire piecework laborers to weed in their 
fields. Much of the country’s maize demand is now meet by large scale wholesalers, who 
have acquired maize throughout the year and release it on to the market through small scale 
venders and wholesalers. Primary assemblers continue to purchase maize, though volumes 
from producers are tiny relative to other times of the year. To make up for any local shortfalls 
in maize, these primary assemblers travel to remote areas and border regions to acquire 
maize. Mozambique, Zambia and Tanzania were all mentioned as potential sources of maize 
during the lean season, as are regions with significant production on irrigated fields, like 
Mchinji and Dedza.  
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Figure 5.  Marketing Channel Diagram (Phase 1:  April - May) 
 
 
Note:  the shaded boxes signify the main channels in terms of volume during this phase of the marketing 
season.  The thickness of the arrow signifies the volume of flow.  Dashed lines represent minor flows.  
Note A:  transactions between medium-scale and large-scale traders are sometimes direct sale and 
sometimes through warehouser-transporters who buy as agents of the large-scale traders.  
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Figure 6.  Marketing Channel Diagram (Phase 2:  July – October) 
 
 
Note:  the shaded boxes signify the main channels in terms of volume during this phase of the marketing 
season.  The thickness of the arrow signifies the volume of flow.  Dashed lines represent minor flows.  
Note A:  transactions between medium-scale and large-scale traders are sometimes direct sale and 
sometimes through warehouser-transporters who buy as agents of the large-scale traders. 
 























Figure 7.  Marketing Channel Diagram (Phase 3:  November – March) 
 
 
Note:  the shaded boxes signify the main channels in terms of volume during this phase of the marketing 
season.  The thickness of the arrow signifies the volume of flow.  Dashed lines represent minor flows.  
Note A:  transactions between medium-scale and large-scale traders are sometimes direct sale and 
sometimes through warehouser-transporters who buy as agents of the large-scale traders. 
 
























Factors influencing the major trade channels and trade volumes: 
 
  Year-to-year production variability, driven by weather and changes in fertilizer use, 
driven by subsidy program 
  Changes in market demand 
  World market conditions – in 2008/09 led to aggressive buying early in year, 
implicitly driving prices up toward import parity early in the season 
  Interest rates, which influence storage costs 
  Access to capital on the part of small-medium scale traders 
  Fuel and transport costs 
  Infrastrucutre development: improvements in rural infrastructure have made more 
places accessible to private traders. 
  ADMARC’s access to adequate funds -- working capital situation  




6.  FARMERS’ PERCEPTIONS OF TRADERS, ADMARC, AND THE 2008 TRADE 
BAN 
 
The  following discussion summarizes some of the comments offered by farmers and 
commercial  traders about market performance.   These  perceptions are obviously  most 
influenced by problems of concern during the recent 2008 marketing season.  Though some 
also reflect worries about persistent trading problems or risks.   These perceptions  provide 




6.1  Farmers’ perception of ADMARC 
 
Farmers, many of whom are rural purchasers of maize, had a range of different perceptions 
about ADMARC.  On the positive side, farmers had three positive things to say about 
ADMARC.  First, farmers appreciated ADMARC and NFRA because it is their view that 
these agencies are the main storers of maize and other agricultural products for the hungry 
season.   
 
Second, there was an appreciation that ADMARC’s presence offered a source of competition 
with the private traders and hence was a way of ensuring that traders were less able to exploit 
them.  
 
Third, farmers needing to buy maize could do so from ADMARC at lower prices than from 
private traders during times of food scarcity e.g. December to February. ADMARC is viewed 
as a government market where the price is known and the farmers are able to buy fertilizer 
and storage chemicals from ADMARC when the situation is normal.  Farmers selling maize 
felt that they were doing their grain deficit neighbors a favor by selling to ADMARC, 
because ADMARC “keeps the grain in the area”, whereas the perception is that traders ship 
grain out of the area.   
 
On the negative side, farmers had perhaps five commonly expressed frustrations with 
ADMARC.   
 
First, farmers agreed that ADMARC’s role in smallholder crop marketing has diminished in 
recent years.  We could not verify this by examining official government data on ADMARC 
maize purchases and sales because such data has not been published or available since 2002.  
 
Second, farmers noted that ADMARC markets constantly run out of funds. This frustrates 
farmers because after harvest the farmers want a ready market to dispose of their products.  
Some farmers stated a preference to sell to ADMARC instead of private traders if ADMARC 
could pay cash promptly. 
 
Third, farmers frequently complained about the behavior of ADMARC clerks.  For example, 
farmers in Chilipa in Blantyre indicated that a bag that weighed 50kg at a private trader 
buying/selling point, weighted 40kg at an ADMARC market.  When farmers run out of maize 
and want to buy from ADMARC, they also incur problems.  According to farmers, 
ADMARC restricts the amount of maize the farmers/consumers need to buy while the same 
clerks sell truckloads to truck drivers.  This also happens when ADMARC is selling fertilizer 
to farmers.  It is alleged that sometimes ADMARC clerks ask farmers to pay MK200 on each 
bag of maize or fertilizer bought.  Most farmers consider cheating and extortion by clerks to 
be a serious and perennial problem with ADMARC.  
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Fourth, ADMARC currently has few clerks in their markets and therefore are unable to assist 
farmers to the fullest.  One farmer group indicated that ADMARC needs at least two 
managers and two clerks per station.  
 
Fifth, ADMARC opens its markets late around July/August, yet farmers harvest crops in 
April/May. Farmers want ADMARC to open its markets in April/May immediately after 
harvest. 
 
Farmers have a very ambiguous relationship with ADMARC. On the one hand, farmers view 
the institution of ADMARC as beneficial to small scale farmers. On the other, their 
experiences with ADMARC employees undermine their confidence in the institution. 
Overall, farmers stated that private traders offered higher prices than ADMARC, had greater 
geographic reach, began purchasing early in the season, and were more reliable in terms of 
having money to buy maize and having maize to sell in lean periods. Additionally, 
ADMARC is not seen to provide farmers with trustworthy scales, both when selling and 
buying maize. The principle advantage farmers identified for ADMARC relative to private 
traders is that selling maize to ADMARC keeps the maize in the area, while selling to private 
traders means that the maize will be shipped out. This perception of course does not coincide 
with reality, because ADMARC normally ships maize out of the region and also sells to local 
traders, while most people agree that local private traders do a good job of ensuring that there 
is maize to buy in rural markets, even during lean periods.  
 
 
6.2  Farmers’ perception of private traders 
 
First, farmers perceive that private traders are there to buy maize when the farmers are 
desperately in need of cash in April/May and ADMARC delays to open its markets.  The 
private traders never run out of money and they pay cash on the spot.  
 
Second, the traders offer better prices than ADMARC and there is often competition among 
the traders to buy as much maize as possible particularly at the start of the season.  
 
However, farmers harbor many negative perceptions of private traders.  First, some of them 
use unreliable weights and measures while others do not want farmers to see the reading on 
their scales. Some farmers stated that private traders, unlike ADMARC, buy maize from the 
villages and are never seen again in the same village during times of food shortage. Some 
farmers perceive that traders sell Malawian maize outside the country, which is considered to 
be “unpatriotic.”   However, some of these perceptions appear to be unfounded.  First, most 
farmers described the existence of established rural markets and that medium-small scale 
maize traders have permanent buying and selling points and are considered reliable sources 
of maize throughout the year.  This makes charges that “traders move grain out of the region” 
to be inconsistent with the view that maize is almost always available in rural markets.   
Secondly, FEWSNET’s estimates of cross-border trade flows suggest very little informal 
maize exports from Malawi.  
 
Second, in certain cases, private traders get produce from farmers on loan. At other times, 
private traders lie to farmer by arguing that produce prices have gone down. The aim is to 




6.3  Farmers’ perception of the maize trading ban 
 
On August 21, 2008, the government issued a press release banning private maize trade in 
Malawi.  The government later issued a clarification note in September stating that small 
traders buying and selling in village markets was legal as long as trade was carried out “in the 
periodical and traditional markets scattered in the villages across the country.” Moreover, 
“the Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security is further asking all those involved in the 
buying and selling of maize in these daily operated markets to observe the Government set 
selling price of MK52 per kilogram…”  Most large traders have interpreted this press release 
as constituting a de facto ban on their operations.   
 
The farmers’ perception on the maize ban was mixed and generally negative.  Some farmers 
who had already sold their maize before August felt that they were unaffected by the trade 
ban.  Among farmers who had yet to sell their maize by August, the main disadvantage of the 
ban has been that frequent charge that ADMARC has no money to buy and no maize to sell.  
Farmers are therefore unable to sell to or to buy maize from ADMARC even after waiting for 
several days or weeks. “Why restrict us to a market that has no money?” queried some 
farmers.  There are always long lines at ADMARC markets.  
 
Farmers who produce significant maize surpluses tend to sell their maize later in the year, in 
order to maximize their returns and to improve the ever important maize/fertilizer price ratio. 
This contrasts with less productive farmers who generally sell maize early in the marketing 
season. It is these productive farmers who are most negatively affected by the government’s 
price regulations and trading ban.  Decreasing the price of maize from 60 per kg to 45 
translates into an increase from 4 bags of maize per bag of fertilizer to 6 bags of maize per 
bag of fertilizer. As such, the price regulations will lead directly to a decrease in inputs access 
for the upcoming farming season for the farming sector most able to produce surpluses of 
maize for the national market. As a result of these price interventions, maize production could 
actually be lower next year because many productive farmers will have less capital to invest 
in the coming farming season. Additionally, the interventions in the market act as a 
disincentive for these farmers to continue to invest in maize production. In fact, government 
interventions in maize markets creates an incentive for the most productive farmers in 
Malawi to cling to the production of crops like tobacco, which offers a more stable and 
transparent market than maize. 
 
Maize farmers in surplus areas continue to hold significant maize stocks, which they had 
hoped to sell at a price above 60 kwacha. When the price regulations were imposed, many of 
these farmers were stuck holding maize stocks that decreased significantly in value. This is a 
group of farmers that is not dependent on fertilizer subsidies, but rather buys most of their 
fertilizer through private channels.  It is anticipated that anywhere where there is a significant 
market for private sector fertilizer sales, there will be a large number of farmers still holding 
maize stocks that they hope to sell at a price higher than the 45 kwacha mandated by the 
government. These surplus producers do see a glimmer of hope in the maize market, since 
some small scale traders are now buying maize at around 50 per kg. However, large scale 
traders capable of buying 100 or more bags are still not very active in the market, and if they 
are, they are buying at 45. The only large scale buyer encountered in October 2008 buying 
maize was Mulli Brothers, who apparently has some sort of contract to buy maize for either 




6.4  Private traders’ perception of the marketing system 
 
There is competition among traders to buy as much maize as possible subject to their working 
capital constraints. The competition also takes place when selling maize to consumers.   
Traders focus on maize because it is easier to source large volumes in one spot, thus reducing 
search and transport costs.  For beans and groundnuts, one incurs high search and transport 
costs as one needs to move to many different places to secure adequate amounts for cost-
effectiveness in transportation. 
 
Some traders felt that the ban on maize trading is fine because it would help small traders to 
sell and buy at similar prices as large traders, who sometimes undercut the smaller trader. 
Furthermore, the ban would help the small traders to buy at reasonable price from farmer and 
to sell the maize to consumers at affordable prices. The setting of prices helps traders to make 
informed decisions on how much to buy and sell as well as where to buy and sell. 
 
Other traders felt that the ban on maize trading is bad for business and it shows government’s 
ambivalence in its pricing policies. At one time traders are told that they are operating in a 
free/liberalized market and at other times the traders are restricted. This is not good for 
business.  Frequent and unexpected changes in prices scare business people. Traders buy 
maize from distant places; incur transportation and storage costs, which shrink their margins. 
Traders should be allowed to set their own prices. Government should not set prices because 
this constrains the trading business. The maize ban made traders lose their money because 
they had already bought maize at a higher price and were told to sell at a lower price. If the 
ban is to control cross-border trade, government should use the police and the military to 
control that as opposed to restricting the prices in the domestic market.  
 
Many traders felt that the trade ban is illogical because it restricts farmers ability to sell 
maize.  They note that ADMARC does not buy from farmers because it lacks funds.  The 
government should allow some of the larger traders such as Mulli Brothers and Transglobe to 
operate in competition with ADMARC. Such traders have the financial muscle to assist 
farmers in the rural areas instead of relying on a corporation that is constantly without money. 
If government wants to set prices, such price bands should be announced much earlier in the 
season e.g. in April to allow business people plan properly. Such price bands should also be 
set in consultation with traders and farmers or their representatives. 
 
Small scale traders buying maize in surplus areas have seen a drop off in maize purchases 
relative to the same time last year. In normal years, maize purchases in surplus regions pick 
up in September and October, as larger farmers release their inventories to buy inputs. This is 
not happening this year to the extent that it did last year because traders are not allowed to 
offer an attractive price to farmers. In fact, for many of these traders, their stocks of maize are 
shrinking as the number of local maize customers grows and purchases slacken.  
 
A chain reaction began when the trading ban and price regulations were imposed in August 
2008. First, the long-distance trade between surplus and deficit regions which these traders 
depend on dried up.  Traders could not operate within the stipulated margin of 45 to 52 
MK/kg (a 7 MK/kg margin), which was insufficient to cover inter-district transfer costs. The 
long-distance inter-district trade has dried up because of the price regulations, leading to a 
cash flow crisis. This cash flow crisis forced small traders to sell maize at a loss to 
ADMARC, since it was the only buyer capable of buying significant quantities of maize. As 
such, the price regulations essentially taxed small to medium scale traders, thereby allowing 
ADMARC to acquire their stocks at a low price. 
  
47
Prior to the regulations, ADMARC was unable to purchase maize because of uncompetitive 
prices.  With maize only trickling in, and more local consumers now buying maize, stocks 
held by these traders are diminishing. This means that these traders, who normally are the 
most effective providers of maize to rural consumers during the lean period, are more likely 
to lack maize stocks to service these markets and capital to acquire maize.  
 
For wholesalers in urban centers like Lilongwe a couple things are happening as a result of 
price regulations. First, for large scale wholesalers, holding more than 500 tons of maize, they 
are unable to sell their maize to their usual customers, like processing companies and urban 
retailers, because they are holding maize that was purchased for more than the prices 
mandated by the government. Lacking cash and a market, these traders have essentially 
withdrawn from the market and are waiting for serious maize shortages to pressure the 
government to free up maize prices. Second, business for smaller scale wholesaler/retailers in 
Lilongwe has become more difficult because of the price regulations. Instead of buying maize 
from traders in rural markets, which is a more efficient way of obtaining significant quantities 
of maize, they are forced to scour rural areas buying directly from farmers and smaller 
bicycle traders. This is because many rural market traders and urban wholesalers are 
operating within the same buying and selling ranges mandated by the government. As a 
result, an important link in the maize chain is damaged, as small scale urban traders have to 
compete directly from rural traders, rather than buying from them. This slows the movement 
of maize from rural to urban areas, since urban traders must now spend a lot of time in rural 
areas buying maize directly from farmers.  
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7.  FARM-GATE TO RETAIL MAIZE MARKETING MARGINS 
 
As described earlier, focus group discussions of maize selling smallholder farmers were 
carried out in September 2009.  Farmers participating in the FGDs were asked to provide 
individual-specific information on their various maize sales transactions, including the price 
received and the month and week of sale.  This information was matched with the price in the 
nearest retail market center as reported in the Ministry of Agriculture’s monthly market price 
bulletins.  Each of the dots below represents the price received by a farmer in the month 
shown.  The solid line shows the retail market price in the nearest retail market catchment 
area.  Figures 8a-d show the relationship between farm-gate and retail prices disaggregated 
by villages defined as “accessible” (15km from market town and/or tarmac road) and 
“inaccessible” (at least 15km to market town and tarmac road).  
 
Figure 8a.  Relationship between Lunzu retail price and farmer-reported prices 




















Note:  Solid line is Lunzu retail maize prices as reported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. Dots 
represent prices received by individual farmers participating in farmer interviews in Makata, Undani, and 
Kunthembwe villages. These villagers reported being 10, 5 and 4km from a market town (Lunzu or Blantyre) 
and the same distances from a tarmac road.  
Ratio of farm-gate to 





Aug: 0.93  
49
Figure 8b.  Relationship between Lunzu retail price and farmer-reported prices 





















Note:  Solid line is Lunzu retail maize prices as reported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. Dots 
represent prices received by individual farmers participating in farmer interviews in Ndala, Chingonawaya, and 
Fred I villages. These villagers reported being 19, 29 and 25km, respectively from a market town, and 19, 29 
and 15km, respectively from a tarmac road. 
Ratio of farm-gate to Lunzu 
retail price, inaccessible 
areas: 
 






Findings from Blantyre district indicate that farmers in accessible villages received between 
73 and 120 percent of the price of maize grain selling in retail markets in the same month.  
By contrast, farmers in inaccessible areas received a somewhat lower share of the retail price, 
between 67 and 94%.   It is not possible to assess whether the implied marketing margins are 
competitive or not because information on traders’ marketing costs are unavailable.  
However, the margins are quite high when compared with margins in other African countries, 
perhaps because this area of Malawi has fairly dense road infrastructure and settlement, even 
in the relatively inaccessible areas.   
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Figure 8c.  Relationship between Luchenza retail price and farmer-reported prices 























Note:  Solid line is Luchenza retail maize prices as reported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. Dots 
represent prices received by individual farmers participating in farmer interviews in Mbewa and Mujiwa 
villages, These villagers reported being 10 and 8 km, respectively from a tarmac road and the same distances 
from a market town.   
 
Ratio of farm-gate price 








August: 0.70  
51
 
Figure 8d.  Relationship between Luchenza retail price and farmer-reported prices 























Note:  Solid line is Luchenza retail maize prices as reported by the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation. Dots 
represent prices received by individual farmers participating in farmer interviews in Chinyama, Mwakhiwa, 
Matiya, and Makokola villages, These villagers reported being 50, 28, 25, and 20km, respectively from a market 
town, and 35, 28, 14, and 20km, respectively, from a tarmac road.  

















Farmers’ share of the retail price in Mulanje district is somewhat lower, between 45% to 90% 
depending on the month.  Food prices from March into April were declining fast after the 
new harvest was starting to come in after the unusually high food prices observed in the 
2008/09 marketing year.  Farmers selling in March were probably in dire need of cash, and it 
appears that they were unable to negotiate for the temporarily high prices observed in March 
2009 since the incoming harvest was sure to make prices fall soon thereafter.  This may 
explain the relatively low ratio of farm prices to retail prices observed in March.  In April and 
May, the farm-gate share rose over 80% in both accessible and remote areas, but then 
declined in June and July as retail prices rose with no apparent transmission of these higher 
prices to farmers.    
 
Figures 8a-d also highlight that there are large differences among farmers in the farm-gate 
prices received in the same village in the same month.  This indicates that there are potential 
gain to be achieved from farmer training in marketing their crops.  For example, while the 
majority of farmers now own or have access to a mobile phone, few feel that owning a 
mobile phone helps them to find a better price for their maize. Instead, the majority of 
farmers use their phones to notify a buyer that they have maize to sell, not to negotiate a price 
or to search for price differences between buyers. This passive approach to marketing is the 
result of a common belief among farmers that private buyers collude to set prices and price 
negotiation is futile.  This belief, however, is not supported by empirical data.  According to 
Figures 8a-d, there is great scope for raising farm-gate prices for producers who currently 
tend to passively accept prices offered to them by traders.   
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8.  CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
8.1  Assessment of Maize Market Performance  
 
1.  Malawi’s maize marketing system is complex and characterized by many alternative and 
competing channels.  There are many different channels by which maize could flow from 
farmers to final consumers.  
 
2.  Shortages in markets and stock-outs at ADMARC markets, leading to huge price surges, 
are perhaps the greatest problem with maize markets in Malawi.  This has happened at 
least three times since 2000.  The years of large seasonal price hikes are generally due to 
poor coordination and consultation between the public and private sectors and unreliable 
crop production information.  Regardless of the causes, the fact that maize prices have 
exceeded $400 per ton in at least three years since 2000 indicates an urgent need to 
identify cost-effective strategies to ensure adequate grain supplies in local markets at 
tolerable prices.  Several options are discussed in Section 6.3. 
 
3.  The evidence points to growing private investment and new entry in maize marketing in 
recent years.  One of the fundamental concerns about the performance of markets in 
Malawi concerns’ smallholders’ “access to markets”.  In the field work carried out in 
2008 and 2009, we found that even in the most inaccessible areas, smallholders cite 
numerous traders visiting their villages during the 4-5 months after harvest to buy surplus 
grain.  When pushed to estimate a number, smallholders in most areas talk about at least 
20 different traders visiting their village each year to buy maize.  Rarely did farmers 
report having under 5 traders to choose from.  According to farmers interviewed in 28 
focus group discussions, most traders go right into villages to buy, with the median 
distance traveled from farm to point of sale being less than 3 km in all cases.  This points 
to evidence of steady investment in grain assembly and transport over the 20 years since 
private grain trade was legalized. Moreover, there has been improvement in road 
infrastructure in recent years, and few if any farmers interviewed in the focus group 
discussions felt that they were “cut off” from markets. These observations call for a re-
examination of the meaning of “access to markets”, “isolated area” and similar phrases.  
Access to markets at a remunerative price is more likely to be the more important issue.   
 
4.  While proximity to demand centers and access to markets are important determinants of 
smallholder farmers’ ability to participate in food markets, survey data reveal that limited 
land and capital are perhaps the primary constraint preventing the majority smallholder 
farmers to enter into commercialized staple food production.  Even with major 
improvements in the performance of food markets, a large percentage of smallholders 
will continue to be unable to produce a surplus that would enable them to link to markets.  
An important conclusion appears to be, therefore, that “access to markets” may not be the 
primary constraint for the bottom 50% of smallholders with inadequate land or productive 
assets to produce a staple food surplus in the first place.  For this bottom 50% of the rural 
farm population, there is a double burden of providing the means to put improved farm 
technology in their hands that is appropriate for their conditions, and then provide a 
market for the output that protects against severe downward price risk.  This boils down 
to simultaneous improvements in farm technology (including for semi-arid conditions in 
which a large fraction of the smallholder population in Malawi resides), access to credit, 
improved rural road infrastructure, and hospitable conditions for private investment in 
rural input retailing and crop assembly.  For the consistently surplus-producing 
smallholders, the main challenges are reducing the transaction costs of marketing output 
and protection against downside price risk.    
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5.  Farmers’ perceptions of both ADMARC and private traders were mixed. Both sets of 
traders were deemed to use unreliable weights and measures to cheat farmers.  More 
farmers indicated that ADMARC staff were the worst, and that maize weighing 10kg on a 
private traders’ scale would generally weigh less than 10kg on an ADMARC scale.   
Consumers wishing to buy grain commonly complained that they received less than what 
they paid for.  Farmers also complained that ADMARC constantly runs out of money and 
that its personnel were very unprofessional in the way they dealt with farmers.  Farmers 
felt that private traders have an increasingly important role in maize marketing and 
government needs to facilitate this role so that the private traders can complement the 
efforts of ADMARC, which currently has serious financial problems. 
 
6.  There remains little trust of private traders either, but this perception appears to be 
supported and even encouraged by many in government.  
 
7.  There were also mixed feelings on the maize price ban. Some farmers and small private 
traders felt that the maize price ban was good because it leveled the playing field. Other 
felt that it stifled their abilty to invest in the upcoming farming season and that it went 
against the rhetoric of the government that “farming is a business.” One farmer in 
Chioshya noted that “if the government wants farming to be a business, then why do they 
destroy our profits with their price ban.”   
 
8.  Some large traders and farmers felt that the ban was bad for business and for maize 
marketing in the country. The ban demonstrates ambivalence to market liberalization on 
the part of the government; one day traders are told that the market is liberalized and the 
next the government steps in to control the prices. The current ban has led large traders to 
“hoard” the maize they bought earlier in the season arguing that selling such maize at the 
government regulated prices would lead to losses.  The phrase “hoarding” is somewhat 
politically loaded and vague as well, because it is not clear how hoarding differs from the 
act of buying maize after harvest in order to release it later in the season given that 
consumers need to eat during all months of the year.  Some farmers are also continuing to 
hold maize because they believe that they would not recover the cost of production if the 
maize was sold at the government-controlled prices. 
 
9. Storage losses:  Although government has speculated that storage losses in 2007/08 may 
have been greater than 30%, our study estimated such losses to be about 14%. This 
compares to 12.9% by a Government of Malawi survey of grain storage losses conducted 
in 2005.  Estimates further show that Malawi will need about 270,000MT of maize 
between October 2008 and March 2009. This is much higher than the 70,000MT 
ADMARC bought this year. However, considering that private traders are holding maize 
stocks and that NFRA has about 70,000MT, it is unlikely that the country would have a 
shortage of maize, assuming that the traders released their stocks. 
 
10.  Traders frequently indicate constraints on availability of quality storage facilities.  There 
are four main causes of storage capacity shortages:  
 
i)  Threat of grain confiscation.  There are perceptions of risk that stored commodities 
will be confiscated or destroyed, especially since August 2008 when government 
regulated the prices at which grain traders could buy and sell maize.  
 
ii)   Unpredictable government operations in grain markets injects a great deal of 
additional risk into grain storage.  Growing concerns over manipulation of national 
crop production estimates and food balance sheets also further erodes confidence in  
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publicly provided information that plays an important role in encouraging storage 
activity in other parts of the world.  
 
iii)  Local banks tend to prefer investing their capital in safe high-return government 
treasury bills.  Malawi, as with most governments in the region, is running deficits, 
which they finance by offering high-interest bills and bonds.  Local banks naturally 
are content to earn a safe return rather than make loans to highly risky investments in 
grain arbitrage. Most of the silo capacity in Malawi remains in public sector hands.  
The potential for selling parastatal storage facilities at concessionary prices as part of 
some future privatization plan acts as a deterrent to new commercial investment in 
storage. This pattern of bank investment also shifts major investible liquidity in a 
country into government operations and programs rather than private sector 
investment.  
 
iv)   The fourth major factor depressing grain storage is the lack of quality standards with 
respect to moisture content.  Assembly traders and wholesalers make little effort to 
discourage the buying of wet maize or to separate it from higher quality dry maize.  If 
anything, the tendency is to combine wet and dry maize in order to mask the ability to 
detect wet maize by the next buyer.  The storage of high-moisture content maize 
results in rotting and high storage losses.  
 
11.  There is great need for more accurate and reliable estimates of annual maize production. 
There is increasing speculation that the official government maize production forecasts in 
the past several years may have been overestimated.  Reduced confidence in official crop 
forecasts creates difficulties in determining whether formal imports are required.   
Evidence of overestimated official crop estimates is that while national maize production 
estimates for the 2007 and 2008 harvests were both far above national consumption 
requirements, imports from Mozambique and Tanzania have been streaming into the 
country almost continuously since mid 2007, and prices in both years have reached levels 
previously seen only in years of severe food crises.  According to FEWSNet, Malawi 
imported 59,000 tons of maize in the 2007/08 season through informal cross-border trade 
flows.  In the first 5 months of the 2008/09 season alone, Malawi has imported over 
49,000 tons of maize (FEWSNet, 2008).   
 
These conclusions are generally consistent with Myers (2008), who used threshold 
autoregressive analysis to investigate whether spatial and temporal price patterns 
observed in Malawi retail maize markets are consistent with conditions required for 
efficient inter-regional trade and storage. The efficiency conditions were generally found 
to hold in the long-run, and short-run deviations from the efficiency conditions generally 
dissipated quickly (half-life of 1-3 weeks). These adjustment speeds compare favorably to 
maize and rice markets in other parts of Africa, and even to maize markets in the U.S.  
Myers’ overall conclusion is that private sector maize markets in Malawi have worked 
quite well over the past decade as they have grown in economic importance.  However, 
his analysis does find several possible exceptions to this general conclusion, e.g., inter-
regional trade between Lilongwe and Mzuzu, and storage in Mzuzu and Nchalo, all of 
which display evidence of much longer adjustment periods than other trade routes and 
storage locations.  In the case of inter-regional trade between Lilongwe and Mzuzu it 
could be that there is little direct trade between these locations because they are a long 
distance apart with multiple intermediate markets operating between them.  
 
Despite Myers’ finding that price patterns over time reflect efficient commercial storage, 
maize stockouts in Malawi stemming from poor harvests may still lead to widespread 
hardship and socially unacceptable hunger and malnutrition. A social safety net for  
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dealing with these problems might have two main dimensions—a strategic grain reserve 
that makes additional public stocks available when a private stockout occurs during times 
of severe shortage; and a contingency plan for imports. Both of these safety nets would 
require treasury support and choosing the right combination is an important public policy 
issue. Furthermore, it is important to have transparent rules for managing the strategic 
grain reserve and a transparent set of contingent contracts in place for importing maize. 
Transparency and predictability are necessary so that the private sector has incentives to 
continue their historically effective role in transporting and storing maize in Malawi. 
 
 
8.2  Competitiveness of Maize Marketing Players 
 
The major conclusions of the report about competitiveness are as follows: 
 
1.  farmers say that they have many marketing options. 
 
2.  some farmers may complain about the price they receive, in all cases they had many 
different traders to which to sell.  We found other farmers in the same village who received 
considerably higher prices selling about the same time of year. This suggests that there is 
scope for training farmers how to be more “market-savvy” and improve their negotiation 
skills.  
 
3.  Schultz's "efficient but poor" observation of low-resource farmers may also appropriately 
describe the functioning of Malawi’s maize marketing system. Marketing margins may 
approximate costs, but these costs may be too high and unstable to encourage rapid private 
investment in the marketing system and promote on-farm productivity growth.  So far, 
liberalization and privatization have replaced often unreliable, high-cost, and centralized 
forms of state marketing with private markets that are competitive but often lacking in 
information, infrastructure, and poorly integrated with other key activities.  Smallholders do 
not have reliable access to forward markets in which a high level of trade occurs on 
standardized quality, quantity, and contract terms. Supply of credit to farmers is severely 
constrained by the absence of a clear mechanism for recovering loans in drought years.   
Financial market failures constrain the demand for productivity-enhancing inputs, which in 
turn limits private investment in durable input delivery systems especially in the more remote 
smallholder areas.  In spite of tangible benefits to many consumers and farmers close to 
markets, food market reform has not by itself successfully addressed the problem of 
sustainably raising farm productivity growth for the millions of low-input semi-subsistence 
rural households in the country. 
 
The challenge for the future is to design coordinated and sustainable systems of input 
delivery, farm finance, and reliable output markets to reduce the costs and risks of input 
intensification in smallholder agriculture.   
 
 
8.3.  What is the role of the public and private sectors in Malawi’s maize marketing 
system? 
 
The essential policy question remains:  what should be the role of the public versus private 
sector?   
 
Current thinking has been to consider ADMARC as a residual buyer and seller, operating 
around a designated floor and ceiling price.  This approach may be warranted as long as the 
margin between the floor and ceiling price is (a) wide enough to allow long-distance trade  
56
between surplus and deficit areas, and is (b) enough to cover seasonal storage costs so that 
the private trade will retain incentives to continue storing maize on its own. Achieving these 
objectives would require that ADMARC move away from pan-territorial and pan-seasonal 
pricing.  
 
In areas where farmers have a lack of buyers at competitive prices, ADMARC can create 
more competition and force traders to offer more competitive prices.  This has been the major 
rationale for the continuation of ADMARC.  But our field work has not found any clear cut 
evidence that traders are reaping excess profits from either spatial or temporal arbitrage.  We 
also found little evidence that farmers in the 18 sites studied (5 of them considered “remote”) 
were cut off from markets or dependent on one or two traders only.  In fact, farmers in all 
villages surveyed cited many maize buyers in the April-October buying season. So, it is not 
clear whether ADMARC’s resources are best placed by focusing on purchasing maize 
directly from farmers.   
 
c) NFRA can store strategic buffer stocks for release onto markets when price levels get too 
high.  Adopting a “rules-based” approach to stockholding policy would require that the terms 
under which NFRA would acquire and release these stocks be transparent, known by all 
marketing actors, and that these rules would be closely adhered to.  The same is true of 
import tariff rates and licensing of traders to engage in external trade.  
 
Whatever involvement government wishes to retain in the maize market, predictable and 
transparent rules governing state involvement in the markets would reduce risks and enable 
greater coordination between private and public decisions in the market.  The phenomenon of 
subsidized government intervention in the market, or the threat of it, leading to private sector 
inaction, is one of the greatest problems plaguing the food marketing systems in the region.  
Effective coordination between the private and public sector would require greater 
consultation and transparency with regard to changes in parastatal purchase and sale prices, 
import and export decisions, and stock release triggers.  As stated by Oygard et al. (2003), 
“unless some very predictable and credible management rules can be established for the 
reserve, private agents will be reluctant to hold stocks, out of a fear that the reserve will be 
sold out at unpredictable times at subsidized prices, undercutting the value of their stored 
commodity.”   
 
Private sector role:  Try to support the Malawi agricultural commodity exchange to develop a 
transparent price discovery process and source of market information that is costless for all 
market participants.   
 
Warehouse receipt system – this requires a building up of the marketing system more so than 
it currently is.  Warehouse receipts are not an isolated service or function; rather they are a 
derived service which is base don a functioning and transparent exchange system that will 
drive the demand for warehouse receipt services (Business Growth Initiative, 2007).  
 
 
8.4.  Potential recommendations: 
 
A major challenge is how to move away from a situation where leaders feel they have to be 
seen as “doing something” by taking populist stances that may entrench dependence on food 
or fertilizer handouts in response to instability-related food crises, but which do little to 
alleviate poverty or hunger in the longer run, and how to create constituencies for policies 
that are believed to promote market stability and small farm incentives to sustainably use 
improved seed and inputs, but which may not necessarily provide short-term patronage  
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benefits.  Given that the GOM is likely to continue operating heavily in maize markets, there 
are several guidelines that might be followed to improve overall market performance: 
 
1.    Follow clearly-defined and transparent rules for triggering government intervention:  
In countries where government involvement in food markets is seen as part of a 
transitional phase towards full market reform, predictable and transparent rules 
governing state involvement in the markets would reduce market risks and enable 
greater coordination between private and public decisions in the market.  The 
phenomenon of subsidized government intervention in the market, or the threat of it, 
leading to private sector inaction, is one of the greatest problems plaguing the food 
marketing systems in the region. Governments and private trading firms strategically 
interact in staple food markets – they respond to each others’ actions and anticipated 
actions.  Effective coordination between the private and public sector will require 
greater consultation and transparency between the private and public marketing agents 
(Brunetti, Kisunko, and Weder, 1997), especially with regard to changes in parastatal 
purchase and sale prices, import and export decisions, and stock release triggers.  
This approach does not imply that government needs be impassive.  The big problem is 
to avoid swamping the whole system with government stock releases or relief aid that is 
uncoordinated with what the private sector is doing.  
 
2.    Institute a forum for regular consultation and coordination between the private and 
public sectors to manage the potential need for maize imports and exports.  There is an 
urgent need for timely information on price movements, stock levels, and trade flows to 
serve as the basis for regular discussion between public and private sector stakeholders.  
Accurate information plus frequent communication is required for a coordinated private 
and public sector response to mitigate the chances of extremely high maize prices and 
associated food crises.  
 
3.    Eliminate maize export bans, import tariff rates, and licensing requirements for trade 
with the region.  These proposed changes will stabilize supplies within the region and 
benefit farmers and consumers in the long run.  Tariffs and other trade policy 
instruments may still be appropriate vis a vis international markets.  However, when 
food prices are abnormally high in the entire region, there appears to be little merit in 
maintaining barriers to importation. While trade bans do not stop trade across borders, 
they do increase the transaction costs associated with it, thereby inflating food prices for 
consumers and contributing to lower prices for farmers.  
 
4.    Streamline border and custom clearing processes and removing controls on the issuing 
of import and export permits.  This would promote the interests of both producers and 
consumers over the long run.  
 
5.    Promote supply chain development for a wider set of crops:   Governments may 
promote more stable farm revenue and consumption patterns through supporting private 
systems of input delivery, finance, and commodity marketing for a range of crops that 
offer higher returns to farming in the changing environment of Africa’s rural areas.  
Such investments would represent a shift from the strategy of price stabilization and 
price support for a dominant staple grain to a portfolio approach that puts greater 
emphasis on a range of higher-valued commodities.  This approach would shift the 
emphasis from direct approaches to stabilize and/or support the price for a dominant 
staple grain to one of minimizing the impact of food price instability by making the 
socio-political economy less vulnerable to the effects of food price instability.   
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6. Invest in an improved crop production forecasting system to serve as a foundation for 
improved consultation and coordination between the public and private sectors. 
Currently, crop forecasting in much of the region is unreliable.  There is mounting 
evidence that the national maize forecasts in Malawi may be overestimated, perhaps 
greatly. Unreliable crop estimates inject a great deal of guesswork into the food balance 
sheets that governments use to estimate import requirements and/or export potential, 
which in turn increases the probability of undershooting or overshooting import 
requirements and the wide price swings commonly associated with them.  Relatively 
inexpensive investments in improved crop production estimates could greatly reduce 
the probability of future food crises.  
 
7.  Training programs for farmers to provide them with knowledge and strategies for 
marketing their crops.  While new technologies, crop diversification, and cooperative 
marketing arrangements may provide farmers with the tools to move from being price-
takers to price-seekers, few of these options are successfully exploited by farmers. For 
example, while about 35% of farmers interviewed now own or have access to a mobile 
phone, few feel that owning a mobile phone helps them to find a better price for their 
maize. Instead, the majority of farmers use their phones to notify a buyer that they have 
maize to sell, not to negotiate a price or to search for price differences between buyers. 
This passive approach to marketing is the result of a common belief among farmers that 
private buyers collude to set prices and price negotiation is futile.  This belief, however, 
is not supported by empirical data.  According to individual price data collected during 
focus group discussions in four districts in 2009, farmers in the same locations obtained 
widely varying prices for their maize in the same month (Figures 8a-d). 
 
8.  REPO Contract: The REPO contract allows the government to extend its grain reserves at 
short notice if needed.  In practice, a premium is paid to assure private sector players 
hold a physical stock of grain for a stipulated period of time.  At the end of this period, 
the government may either purchase this stock at a pre-arranged price (to supplement its 
stock held by the NFRA), or allow the stock to be sold on local or export markets by its 
private owners.  In effect, the physical inventory remains in country and on call, if the 
government later requires this.  
 
  This transaction works best following a harvest with a grain surplus.  The additional 
grain purchases underlying the REPO help establish a floor under farmgate prices.  The 
REPO size and strike price, at which the government would exercise the option, signals 
to private traders when a market intervention is likely.  
 
  Two things are important for the success of this strategy.  First the contract should be 
completed on a timely basis to assure it helps to life farmgate prices when these are 
most likely to be lowest – just after a favorable harvest.  Second, the size and pricing of 
the transaction should be publicly known. Private traders then retain an incentive to 
buy, stock, and sell grain at price levels up to the designated strike price.  And these 
actors know what size of inventory will be dropped on the market when the strike price 
is exceeded.  
 
  It may be worth noting that the government has considered implementing a REPO 
contact during both the 2007 and 2008 post-harvest period.  If this deal had been 
completed in 2007, more stocks would have been available to offset the rise of prices in 
early 2008.  If the REPO had been implemented shortly after the 2008 harvest, this 
could have helped support farmgate prices while improving the transparency of the 
government’s stockholding strategy.  Once the strike price rose above import parity  
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prices, however, Malawi may have been better off considering a physical call option to 
import grain.  
 
9.  Call option: If there is a strong prospect for the domestic price of maize to rise above 
import parity price levels (generally calculated based on the price of maize in South 
Africa plus transport costs), Malawi should consider negotiating a physical call option.  
This allows the country to import a given quantity of grain at an agreed price at some 
agreed date in the future. The payment of a premium creates the opportunity to make 
this purchase.  If the domestic prices remain below import parity prices, the option may 
not be exercised. If domestic prices rise well above import parity, the import would 
logically be pursued. This sort of contract can be particularly valuable when regional 
grain prices and transport costs are rising – for example after a broad regional drought.  
Due to rising grain prices, Malawi is estimated to have saved US$70 per ton of maize 
imported in 2005 under a call option.  Since the contract was negotiated a bit late, 
domestic grain prices still rose to unprecedented levels. However, these prices might 
have increased even further if the call option had never been pursued.   
 
10.  Focus government budgets on cost-reducing public investments to support the 
development of input and output markets and smallholder farm productivity.  Many 
agricultural market failure problems in Africa reflect an under-provision of public 
goods investments to drive down the costs of marketing and contracting.  Ameliorating 
market failure is likely to require increased commitment to investing in public goods 
(e.g., road, rail and port infrastructure, R&D, agricultural extension systems, market 
information systems) and institutional change to promote the functioning of market-
oriented trading systems.  Unfortunately the large share of government expenditures 
devoted to food and input marketing operations represents a high opportunity cost in 
terms of foregone public goods investments to promote the functioning of viable food 
markets. 
 
Important public goods investments would include:  
 
a)  Human and financial resources dedicated towards seed varietal development, 
improved soil fertility management, and other crop management activities to raise 
smallholder farm productivity. 
b) Seed system development initiatives, based on either private sector leadership or 
public/private partnerships.   
c)  Farmer extension programs:  weak public programs to improve farmer knowledge and 
management practices are dragging down the potential for farm productivity growth 
in many countries in the region (World Bank 2007).  The farmer focus group 
discussions highlighted some differences in farmers’ marketing skills when it came 
to negotiating with traders and knowing when to sell.  It is often NGO extension 
agents that interact with smallholder farmers to improve their crop husbandry and 
marketing practices and to raise the efficiency of their use of fertilizer, rather than 
the public sector extension service.  The substantial variation in maize yields even 
within villages as commonly observed in household survey data attest to the 
productivity growth that could be achieved simply by raising the yields and 
fertilizer response rates of the bottom half of the farmers to match mean levels 
achieved in each village.  
d)  Initiatives to organize farmers into viable groups for accessing seasonal loans to 
finance crop input purchase, obtaining support services (e.g., crop husbandry crop 
husbandry knowledge, marketing skills and techniques, soil testing for fine-tuning 
efficient fertilizer use recommendations), and achieving scale economies in crop 
marketing.  Major progress in organizing grass-roots farmer groups to access  
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knowledge, financing and inputs has been made in Kenya through the Kenya 
Market Development Programme, and the benefits being achieved there provide a 
blueprint for wider replication throughout the region. 
e)  Public goods investments in physical infrastructure, e.g., roads, electrification, and 
port development.   
f)  Stable state institutions to support commerce and private investment.  Providing a 
stable institutional environment is critical for private investment in communications, 
means of transport, storage, and other investments complementary to the public 
investments listed above.  
 
While calls for increased investments in these areas are not new, their high payoffs have been 
well documented in the Asian green revolution experience (see Fan, Gulati, and Thorat, 
2007) and continue to be major priorities for agricultural growth and food security in most of 
Africa.  
 
11.  An important component of an agricultural markets programs should be on-the-ground 
monitoring of program/policy implementation and impact.  Close monitoring in the field 
would provide the potential for quick feedback to policy makers regarding on-the-ground 
implementation of reform policies and allow for mid-course corrections if activities are not 
conforming to expectations.  It would also enable researchers to more accurately measure the 
impacts of particular marketing policy strategies (as actually implemented instead of basing 
their impact assessments on stated policy documents).  This will reduce the tendency to mis-
identify policy effects and thereby provide a more accurate empirical foundation for future 
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Appendix Table 1: Storage Costs for Farmers and Small-Medium Traders on Monthly and Yearly Basis per 50kg Bag – excluding 
financing costs, 2008 
AREA Farmers  Small-Medium  Traders   
  Rent (MK/Bag)  Chemicals (MK/Bag)  Total (MK/Bag)  Rent (MK/Bag)  Chemicals (MK/Bag)  Total (MK/Bag) 
  Monthly Yearly Monthly Yearly Monthly  Yearly  Monthly  Yearly  Monthly Yearly  Monthly  Yearly 
Blantyre 0.00  0.00  2.78  33.33  2.78 33.33  26.67 320.00  2.78  33.33 29.44 353.33 
Mulanje 0.00  0.00  3.21  38.50  3.21 38.50  16.50 198.00  3.21  38.50 19.71 236.50 
Dowa 0.00 0.00  2.30 27.55 2.30 27.55  12.45 149.43  2.30  27.55 14.75 176.98 
Mchinji 0.00  0.00  2.38  28.60  2.38 28.60  13.90 166.82  2.38  28.60 16.29 195.42 
Lilongwe  - - - - -  -  30.62  367.39  2.87  34.38  33.48 401.78 
 
Appendix Table 2: Storage Costs for Farmers and Small-Medium Traders on Monthly and Yearly Basis per Kilogram – excluding 
financing costs, 2008 
Farmers   Small-Medium  Traders   
AREA  Rent (MK/kg)  Chemicals (MK/kg)  Total (MK/kg)  Rent (MK/kKg)  Chemicals (MK/kg)  Total (MK/kg) 
  Monthly Yearly Monthly Yearly  Monthly 
 
Yearly  Monthly Yearly  Monthly  Yearly Monthly Yearly 
Blantyre 0.00  0.00  0.06  0.67  0.06 0.67 0.53 6.40 0.06  0.67 0.59 7.07 
Mulanje 0.00  0.00  0.06  0.77  0.06 0.77 0.33 3.96 0.06  0.77 0.39 4.73 
Dowa 0.00  0.00  0.05  0.55  0.05 0.55 0.25 2.99 0.05  0.55 0.29 3.54 
Mchinji 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.57 0.05 0.57 0.28 3.34 0.05  0.57 0.33 3.91 







Appendix Table 3: Gross Marketing Margin Analysis for Small-Medium Traders for the Period April to October 2008 














BLANTYRE Lunzu  Area             
  Close to ADMARC (Chanika Village)   59.00  50.00   9.00  1.20 0.59  1.79 7.21 
 Far  from  ADMARC  (Chilipa  EPA) 59.00  43.75  15.25  2.50 0.59  3.09  12.16 
  Kunthembwe Area            
  Close to ADMARC (Kuthembwe EPA)   57.00  48.75  08.25  2.20 0.59  2.79 5.46 
  Far from ADMARC (Kusena Village)  57.00  30.00  27.00  4.10 0.59  4.69  22.31 
  Blantyre Average  58.00 43.13  14.87  2.50 0.59  3.09  11.78 
              
MULANJE Chisinkha  Area            
  Close to ADMARC (Chisinkha Village)  55.00  37.50  17.50  0.10 0.39  0.49  17.01 
  Far from ADMARC (Ndala Village)  55.00  33.75  21.25  0.40 0.39  0.79  20.46 
  Makokola Area            
 Far  from  ADMARC  55.00  37.50  17.50  1.00 0.39  1.39  16.11 
  Mulanje Average  55.00 36.25  18.75  0.50 0.39  0.89  17.86 
              
DOWA Madisi  Area            
  Close to ADMARC (Madisi EPA)  54.00  41.00  13.00  0.50 0.29  0.79  12.21 
  Far from ADMARC (Kabanga Village)  54.00  37.00  17.00  1.30 0.29  1.59  15.41 
  Bowe Area            
  Close to ADMARC (Mwalala Village)   52.00  40.00  12.00  1.20 0.29  1.49  10.51 
  Far from ADMARC (Madziyada Village)  52.00  36.00  16.00  2.30 0.29  2.59  13.41 
  Dowa Average  53.00 38.50  14.50  1.33 0.29  1.62  12.88 
              
MCHINJI  Close to ADMARC (Chiwosya EPA)  55.00  48.00   7.00  2.10 0.33  2.43 4.57 
  Far from ADMARC (Mphanga Village)  55.00  45.00  10.00  3.90 0.33  4.23 5.77 
  Mchinji Average  55.00 46.50   8.50  3.00 0.33  3.33 5.17 
 
 